




I. The Purpose of Guardianship and the Appointment of a Guardian
A. Historical Analysis
B. Guardianship Process
C. Lack of Continuity in State Statutes
II. May a Felon Still be a Guardian?
A. Reducing the Effect of a Prior Felony Conviction: Annulments,
Dismissals, Expunctions and Pardons
1. Dismissal/annulment of the felon’s record:
2. Expungement and the Sealing of the Felon’s Record
a. The Process of Obtaining Expunction or Sealing of Record
of Conviction
b. The Effect of Expunction or Sealing upon Requirement to
Report Conviction or Qualification for Guardian Status
3. Obtaining a Pardon from the Felony Conviction
a. The Process of obtaining a Pardon
b. The Legal Effect of a Pardon
4. Summary for the Mitigation of the Conviction
B. Seeking Alternatives to Guardianship: The Durable Power of Attorney
1. Advantages of a Durable Power of Attorney over a Guardianship
Appointment
2. The Risks Inherent in a Durable Power of Attorney
3. Distinguishing Characteristics
III. Should Legislation be Uniform Among the States?
A. Generally
1. Uniform Standards




3. Best Interest/Judicial Discretion:
B. Preservation of Checks and Balances
C. Considerations of Policy-Makers
1. Rational Basis Challenges
2. Should Adoption of Uniform Models and Standards be Mandatory?
a. Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Placement Act
i. Interstate Guardianships
b. National Probate Court Standards:
c. National Guardianship Association Standards











Courts require discretion in appointing guardians. Oftentimes, the legislature
prevents the courts from exercising discretion when statutes are enacted that prohibit
felons from serving as guardians under any circumstances. Yet, the need for guardians is
increasing and will continue to do so due to the exponential growth in the aging elder
population.
At the same time, however, the pool of potential guardians is shrinking in size.
Additionally, the same reducing pool of eligible guardians is being attenuated further by
having a disproportionate amount of felonies.
The groups most impacted by these trends are the indigent and the minorities.
The indigent do not have the resources to hire guardians and often, the only persons
eligible and available to serve as guardians are family members. The minorities may be
impacted if they are of a race that has historically possessed a disproportionate amount of
felons. If poverty and race are considered, along with an increasing number convicted
felonies, a significant problem develops in finding eligible guardians.
Persons convicted of felonies should be scrutinized closely to determine whether
it is in the ward’s best interest to have said person appointed as a guardian, but certain
statues completely prevent the court from making such a consideration.
The alternatives available to the convicted felon to mitigate against the complete
restraint are woefully inadequate. The remedies of dismissal, annulment, expungement,
and pardon are not feasible for most felons. The signing of a durable power of attorney is
not available to many indigent and elderly persons, or to children who have been
developmentally challenged since birth.
Other considerations, such as extending full faith and credit, comity or the best
interest standard are equally inadequate to resolve the needs for guardians. Finally, the
uniform codes and proposed standards do not address the issue sufficiently.
This article promotes allowing the judiciary discretion to appoint felons in certain
situations where it would be in the best interest of the ward. The article further discusses
the inadequacies of the uniform codes and proposed standards in this area of concern.
1 Associate Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. Special thanks to my brother,
Kenneth K. Jorgensen, and to R. Carter Burgess, Bradley C. Shriver and Rebecca L. Zoeller
for their assistance in writing this article.
2Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 351,
352-53 (1999) (“The increase in the proportion of elderly relative to the total population and
corresponding increases in the life expectancy of the elderly and their assistance needs suggest
that the volume of probate caseloads is likely to expand accordingly--and, in fact, may already
have begun to do so.”).
3CHRISTOPHER UGGEN & JEFF MANZA, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF FELON
DISFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2001). The impoverished are the most in
need of guardians as the economic incentives to serve as their guardians are absent where the
incapacitated lacks assets. Felons are proportionately more likely to be living in poverty.
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The Convicted Felon as a Guardian:





The pool of potential guardians is shrinking and the demand for guardians is
increasing.2 Considering that the proportionate number of felonies in the United States is
increasing, along with the demand for additional guardians, more and more often convicted
felons may be placed in situations where they will be the only persons feasible to act as
guardians. This is especially true in situations where the ward is indigent or is in a minority
race that has a disproportionate amount of convicted felons.3
The problem of disqualifying all felons from serving as guardians will most likely
negatively impair the indigent and minority groups in comparison to those wards who
4Hetherington v. State Pers. Bd., 82 Cal. App.3d 582 (Ct. App. 1978); Wesley v. Collins, 605 F.
Supp. 802 (D.Tenn.1985) (the case discusses the disenfranchising of voting blacks due to the
disproportionate number of felons within the group, and the court finds that the voting rights
statute did not unlawfully dilute their vote under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments,
notwithstanding statute's disproportionate impact on blacks, i.e., it did not deprive blacks of
equal protection). See also Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, New Frontiers in Fair Lending: Confronting
Lending Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1237, 1270 (Oct. 2005).
5Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and
Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L. J.
633, 713 (Summer 1992) ("Similarly, a proxy decision-maker who is not serving the ward's
interests should be replaced. With unpaid proxies, however, there is seldom anyone willing to
undertake the task. There is, therefore, a need for a public guardian who can serve as a guardian
of last resort. In England, the Court of Protection, under the Public Trustee, provides such a
service. A number of states in the United States have public guardians to serve the indigent,
although Florida, for example, has public guardians in only two court circuits.").
6It is beyond the scope of any such article to address in detail all of the issues and possible
solutions in all jurisdictions in the United States. Such issues can only be addressed in
general; adapting the suggestions for local law and practice will be necessary.
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possess estates with significant assets.4 In situations where the estates are small or non-
existent, it is difficult to find people willing to serve as guardians, especially since the
guardian’s responsibilities are significant and the estates are not sufficient to provide
adequate compensation.5 Such cases present special legal challenges to both courts and
practitioners. This article will address the special legal challenges of felons as guardians,
discuss different approaches or solutions that jurists may wish to consider when selecting
possible guardians that may have less-than-perfect records, and expose deficiencies in the
uniform codes, statutes and standards concerning felons seeking appointments as guardians.6
The first section of this article briefly discusses the basics of guardianship law and
describes the issue in more detail. The second section addresses certain legal implications of
past felony convictions on the appointment of a guardian, and (1) how to reduce the effects
of a prior felony conviction through annulment, expunction and pardon, and (2) alternatives
to guardianship, such as the durable power of attorney, if available. The third section
7See Symposium, Creating the “Portable” Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications
of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L. J.
351 (1999).





discusses decisions that policy makers may have to consider, including: (1) whether a forum
state court must provide full faith and credit to a foreign judgment or decree of guardianship,
(2) whether legislation that deprives a court of discretion of whether to appoint a guardian
violates separation of powers or equal protection, and (3) whether there are needs of having
standardized uniform legislation regarding the appointment of felons as guardians.
Furthermore, this article will explore the idea of the "best interest standard" for the ward,
specifically whether the modern guardianship system truly utilizes a best interest standard,
and whether there is a need for reform. For example, the increase in interstate travel raises
jurisdictional, venue, and conflict of laws issues inherent in the present guardianship system.7
This paper will address two of the resulting dilemmas from the present structure, which
includes the possibility of encouraging forum shopping, and the extent full faith and credit
pertains to guardianship eligibility in interstate guardianships.
General Demographic Information
In the past century, the United States’ population has significantly increased in the
median age.8 In the 1860s, the median age was nineteen years of age and in 2050, the
median age is projected to be forty-five years.9 In 1900, the life expectancy for males was
forty-six and roughly forty-eight for females.10 Today, the life expectancy for males and
11Http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/lifexpec.htm.
12 Mathew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Felony Sentences in State Court, 2002,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. (U.S. Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2004
(estimated 1.1 million felony convictions in 2002); See also, Mathew R. Durose & Patrick A.
Langan, Ph.D., Felony Sentences in State Court, 2000, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. (U.S.
Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.), June 2003 (estimated 983, 823 felony convictions in
2000).
13Mathew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Felony Sentences in State Court, 2002,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. BULL. (U.S. Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2004, at 2.
14Id.
15Id.
16See Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Felony Sentences in State Courts,
2000, BUR. OF JUST. STATS.BULL. (U.S. Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.) June 2003;
Matthew R. Durose, David J. Levin & Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D., Felony Sentences in State
Courts, 1998, BUR. OF JUST. STATS. BULL.(U.S. Dept of Just., Washington, D.C.) Oct. 2001.
17 Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001, BUR.
OF JUST. STATS.SPECIAL REP. (U.S. Dept. of Just., Washington, D.C.) Aug. 2003, at 1.
18Id.
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females ranges between 73.8 (males 1998) and 79.5 (females 1998).11
At the same time the elder population rapidly ages, every year in the United States,
over one million people are convicted of felonies, a statistic that continues to increase.12 Not
all felonies are for dishonesty, theft or exploitation. Currently about a third of felony
convictions are for drug offenses,13 while theft and burglary offenses constitute about a third
of felony convictions, with approximately one third of these being fraud related.14 The
remaining convictions are for violent offenses, weapon offenses and nonviolent crimes.15
These statistics have remained relatively constant since 1998.16 As of 2001, one in
thirty-seven adults in the United States had served time in prison.17 Six and a half percent of
persons born in 2001 will go to prison in their lifetime if current rates of incarceration remain
unchanged.18 This statistic has increased from a little over five percent of persons born in
19Id. Please note that this is rate of incarceration, and may not reflect the rate of conviction.
20Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 351,
652-53 (1999) (“More critically, probate courts are likely to face significant problems . . . with
legal considerations of jurisdiction, venue, full faith and credit, comity, and conflicts of laws.”
For example, . . . “If a court of competent jurisdiction in another state appointed a guardian for
an incapacitated person, should a probate court give full faith and credit to the guardianship
order if the incapacitated person moves to the new jurisdiction? What if the existing
guardianship order grants rights or powers to the guardian that, as a matter of public policy,
would not be granted in the new state?”).
21Http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/statab/t991x01.pdf.
22 The words “Guardian” and “Guardianship” as used in this article include all types of
guardianships of the person or estate of an incapacitated person, even though defined
differently in state law, unless otherwise indicated in the article. “Guardianships” as used in
the article are considered the same as conservatorships and tutorships of the person or estate,
whether limited or plenary. Additionally, although the Uniform Probate Code and various
state statutes distinguish between the definitions of conservator and guardian, i.e., a
conservator means a person appointed by the court to manage the estate of the ward, whereas
a guardian is a court-appointed person responsible for the care, custody, and control of the
ward. This article will use the term “guardian” in a generic manner as the person responsible
under court order for both the person and the property of the ward. The issue raised herein
does not uniformly distinguish between guardianships established for adults versus
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1991 and almost two percent of persons born in 1974.19
The rate of increasing felons requires contemplation when we consider the pool of
persons available to serve as guardians over those who are incapacitated due to infirmity,
dementia or physical aliments.20 The differences in how the states define eligibility for
potential guardian applicants ranges from states that exercise little restraint in the
appointment of guardians to those that completely prohibit felons as guardians.
The birth rate has declined dramatically since the 1950’s.21 As a result, incapacitated
people may have fewer, or perhaps no, children who would be eligible to act as their
guardians. Further limiting the potential pool of eligible guardians by precluding felons from
serving in that capacity acts as a major disadvantage to the incapacitated with few or no
children.
These statistics indicate an increasing likelihood that persons with felony convictions
in their history may seek the appointment, or have already received an appointment, as
guardians22 of incapacitated spouses, parents or children. Furthermore, as our society
guardianships established for minors in age. Oftentimes, states have different requirements
for the different guardianship categories.
23Florida Coastal School of Law’s Elder Law Clinic represented the mother of a developmentally
disabled child in 1999. The mother, as natural guardian in Florida, had the right to make
decisions for her son and to obtain medical and dental care. When the son turned eighteen years
of age, however, under Florida law he was presumed competent and his legal disability was
removed as a matter of law. The mother sought assistance from the Clinic to obtain a
guardianship over her son whom she had been taking care of for eighteen years so that she could
continue to make decisions for her son’s welfare. The mother was disqualified since Florida
statutes prevent a felon from serving as a guardian regardless of the circumstances. Nineteen
years earlier, the mother had a felony conviction for accessory to robbery. It was her only
conviction or trouble with the law. The court felt compelled under the statute to disqualify the
mother from acting as her son’s guardian. The court interpreted the statute as a total
disqualification for eligibility. The court further denied eligibility despite arguments that the
conviction may be eligible for expungement, or that the mother may be eligible of a pardon, or
that her rights might be restored. No alternative would have persuaded the court to allow the
mother to act as guardian since the statute was unambiguous that felons are not eligible to serve
as guardians in Florida.
24See In re Guardianship of MEO, 2006 WL 2022472 (Wyo. 2006); See also, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 34-1-102(a) (2005) ("Parents are the joint natural guardians of their minor children, . . . .");
Lacy v. Arvin, 780 A.2d 1180 (2001); Cruickshank-Wallace v. County Banking & Trust Co.,
885 A.2d 403 (Md.Ct. Spec. App. 2005); ARK.CODE ANN. § 28-65-501 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN.
10 § 1009 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. 13 § 701 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.301 (West 2006);
In re: Standards and Procedures for the Prot. of Minors in the Settlement of Pers. Injury,
Wrongful Death and Med. Malpractice Lawsuits and Claims, FL ST 11 J CIR 03-12 (West
2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 29-2-3 (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1651 (2006);
McConnell v. McConnell, 177 N.E. 692 (1931); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203 (2006);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 104.140 (West 2006); 4B NJPRAC § 95.3(R. 4:72-2) (West 2006); N.C. GEN
.STAT. .ANN. § 35A-1201 West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.69 (West 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1-112 (West 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1-102 (West 2006); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 676 (Vernon 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-204 (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. §
31-1 (West 2006); 3A COPRAC § 101.4 (West 2006).
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becomes more mobile, with a guardian possibly seeking to move or relocate the ward to a
different jurisdiction that may possess different eligibility requirements, questions develop
around the deference the state accepting the transitioning ward ("the forum state") must give
to the prior state's guardianship orders and decrees ("the foreign state").
Two primary classes of persons affected by the reduced guardian pool are the
incapacitated in minority races and the indigent elderly. Consider the situation where a child
is born developmentally disabled or becomes developmentally challenged prior to turning
eighteen years of age.23 While the child is under the age of majority, the natural parent may
make both personal and health care decisions for the child.24 Once the child’s disability is
2581 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 209 (2006) (presumption of competence to testify as a witness at
age 14). Richard A. Lord, Capacity of Parties--Infants, in 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:3
(4th ed. 2006).
26FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309(3) (West 2006).
27Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health Care: A
Report Prepared for the Commission to Study Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 153 (Spring 1995)("New Jersey has the second oldest population of all 50 states,
after Florida. . . .By the year 2000, one in every five [citizens] will be 65 years or older. The
over-60s group will double in the early decades of the 21st century. The very old population
(over 85) more than doubled between 1970 and 1990, and will nearly double again by 2010.
Demographic and related income factors have a significant impact on women's access to health
services and their consequent health. Two-thirds of women aged 65 and over are widowed,
divorced or single, compared to only a third of men aged 65 and over. Poverty is a major issue
for elderly women. Nationally, the median income for women over 65 is $9,400. Median
incomes for elderly women of color are even lower. One in four New Jersey women aged 65 or
older lives at or near the poverty level. The incidence of poverty among men aged 65 and over is
half that for women. The incidence of poverty is highest for women of color and those who live
alone. The incidence of poverty increases with age."(referring to Peter M. Cicchino, The
Problem Child: an Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child Poverty in the United
States, 5 J.L. & POL. 5 (1996)).
28In re Estate of Roy v. Roy, 265 Ill.App.3d 99 (Ill.App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 1994)(noting that the
Illinois statute that prohibited convicted felons from serving as guardians was not a bill of
attainder, ex post facto law, or violation of equal protection clause on its face, and holding that
the statutory minimum criteria for guardian was not inconsistent with statute that allowed the
ward to express a choice of guardian, and the statute could violate fourteenth amendment as
applied, but a hearing would be necessary to determine whether rational basis for a statutory
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removed due to the prescription expiring by operation of law, the child will be presumed
competent.25 Only upon a showing of incapacity will the court appoint a guardian or
guardian advocate. In the case where the natural parent is the only feasible person to act as
the child’s guardian, and the parent has been convicted of a felony, even if it is from an event
that happened two decades earlier, courts in some states lack discretion to appoint the parent-
guardian regardless of the circumstances, the nature of the felony, the age of the felony, the
severity of the felony, and the ward’s best interest.26
Likewise, in addition to incapacitated children, the elderly are also at risk27 For
instance, assume that an elderly husband becomes incapacitated after years of marriage, there
are no children able to serve as guardians, and the only feasible person able to serve is the
wife, who has a prior felony conviction.28 In certain states, the wife is completely precluded
distinction existed as applied to the case). See also, W. W. Allen, Mental Incompetency of one
Spouse as Affecting Transfer or Encumbrance of Community Property, Homestead Property, or
Estate by the Entireties, 155 A.L.R. 306 (1945).
29DEBBIE FIELD, GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP INTERIM COMMITTEE MINUTES (Aug.
10, 2004), http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2004/interim/guardian0810min.pd. See
also, ASHLEY COLVIN, JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IMPACT OF AN AGING POPULATION ON STATE AGENCIES (Nov. 14, 2005),
http://jlarc.state.va.us/ Meetings/November05/agingclr.pdf.
30 “Parens patriae” is interpreted as “Parent of his or her Country.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004); Daniel Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A
Comparison of the State’s Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests
Determinations for Children and Incompetent Adults, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283 (1991).
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due to a prior felony conviction from serving as her husband’s decision-maker. The indigent
population is greatly affected since they do not have estates sufficient to hire professional
guardians, and their likely pool of potential guardians will be family members that volunteer
to assist in an unpaid and uncompensated capacity.29 Even if a professional guardian is
retained, the guardian may not be appointed to make health care decisions, as would a
spouse. However, if the felon spouse is unable to make temporal decisions, they would also
be precluded under guardianship statutes from serving over the person's healthcare as well.
Under guardianship principles, should a court have autonomy to make a
decision in appointing a guardian for the best interest of the ward, on a case by case basis, or
should legislation that prohibits the felon from serving as guardian take priority over court
discretion?
I. The Purpose of Guardianship and the Appointment of a Guardian
A. Historical Analysis
Before delving into the deficiencies present in the modern guardianship system, it is
important to understand the historical blueprint of the system. The modern guardianship
system is derived from early English common law, and founded on the doctrine of parens
patriae.30 Originating in medieval England, this doctrine focused on the incapacitated and
empowered the Crown to protect and care for individuals who could not do so for
31 Parens patriae is a power inherited from English law where the Crown assumed the "care
of those who, by reason of their imbecility and want of understanding, are incapable of
taking care of themselves." Phillip Tor, Finding Incompetency in Guardianship:
Standardizing the Process, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 749 (1993) (quoting NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE,
THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 59 (1971) (quoting L. SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON
THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 6 (1833)).
32See Paula L. Hannaford & Thomas L. Hafameister, The National Probate Court Standards:
The Role of the Courts in Guardianship and Conservatorship Proceedings, 2 ELDER L.J. 147
(1994).
33 See Phillip Tor, Finding Incompetency in Guardianship: Standardizing the Process, 35
ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1993).
34Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57 (1890).
35See Peter Mosanyi II, A Survey of State Guardianship Statutes: One Concept, Many
Applications, 18 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 253 (2002).
36 See Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States,
8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599 (1985).
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themselves.31 Parens patriae was first introduced to America during the colonial period and
has since been fully adopted in the states.32
In the United States, the doctrine of parens patriae has been transferred to each
individual state and codified in state-specific guardianship statutes delineating its primary
purpose of protecting the best interest of the ward.33 This power was first recognized by the
Supreme Court in Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Chris of Latter-Day Saints v. United
States, where the Court held “that it is indispensable that there should be a power in the
legislature to authorize a sale of the estates of infants, idiots, insane persons and persons not
known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves.”34 Since this recognition by the
Supreme Court, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted the doctrine of
parens patriae and implemented guardianship statutes.35 Although its benevolent purpose of
the ward’s best interest is undeniable, it is questionable whether the guardianship system, in
its present non-uniform stature, is succeeding in the appointment of persons to serve as
guardians.36
B. Guardianship Process
37 See Paula L. Hannaford & Thomas L. Hafameister, The National Probate Court Standards:
The Role of the Courts in Guardianship and Conservatorship Proceedings, 2 ELDER L.J. 147
(1994).
38Norman Fell, Guardianship and the Elderly: Oversight Not Overlooked, 25 TOL. L. REV. 189,
190 (1994).
39Id. See Daniel Griffith, The Best Interests Standard: A Comparison of the State’s Parens
Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best Interests Determinations for Children and
Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283 (1991); UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GUARDIANSHIPS: COLLABORATION NEEDED TO PROTECT
INCAPACITATED ELDERLY PEOPLE (2004),http:// www.gao.gov.
4057 C.J.S. MENTAL HEALTH § 124(VIII)(B)(1) (2006).
41In re Estate of Roy, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 104 (holding that the selection of a guardian is
subject to the statutory criteria, and where such criteria is clear and unambiguous, the courts
must act accordingly).
42In re Lagrange, 274 N.Y.S. 702 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
10
The term “guardianship” refers to the legal relationship established when a person
(the “guardian”) is given legal responsibility for another person (the “ward”), and/or the
property of the person, when the person is incapable of handling his or her affairs due to
minority or incapacity.37 Procedurally, the court operates in a protective manner, similar to
that of a parent, monitoring and managing the ward’s personal and property affairs.38
Although the best interest of the ward is the fundamental principle of the guardianship
system, the appointment of a guardian can be rather intrusive, as it generally results in the
ward losing most, if not all, basic civil rights.39
Although the probate courts have jurisdiction over guardianship proceedings, the
courts’ judicial discretion in the selection of guardians is often limited by statutes.40 As will
be illustrated later, the selection of the guardian can be problematic as the courts struggle to
balance the best interests of the ward with the statutory requirements enacted by the state
legislators.41 The competing tension between the probate courts and the legislature can result
in injustice throughout the system.42
C. Lack of Continuity in State Statutes
Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted guardianship
43See Table in Appendix A, and http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html.
44See Symposium, Creating the “Portable” Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications
of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J.
351 (1999).
45ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309(3) (West 2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 33-15-6(b), 33-15-44 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.020
(West 2006).
46ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-311(d) (2006); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.059 (West 2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A: 4 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.03 (West 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 4-105 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.210(1) (West 2006);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 678(Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-8(a) (West 2006).
47ALA. CODE § 26-2A-104(a) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145 (2005); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 2650 (West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-311 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45a-676(f) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 12, § 3901 (2006); GA.. CODE ANN. §
29-5-2 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560: 5-310 (LexisNexis 2006); IND. CODE ANN. §
29-3-5-4 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.559 (West 2006); KAN. PROB. CODE ANN. §
59-3067(e)(1) (West 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.600 (West 2005); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 5 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. EST. & TRUSTS § 13-206 (West 2006); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 201, § 6 (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1628 (West 2006);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-309 (West 2006); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-13-121 (2006); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 475.050 (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-312 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30-2627 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-25 (West 2006); N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW § 81.19 (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35A-1290 (2005); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-28-11 (2005); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5511(f) (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-
5-410 (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-110 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-3-103
(2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-311 (2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 3072 (2005); VA.
CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.13 (2006).
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statutes,43 the lack of continuity between the states has created many problems in the
guardianship arena, most notably in relation to felons’ guardianship eligibility.44 For
instance, there are at least three distinct categories of State laws concerning the eligibility of
individuals with past felony convictions to serve as guardians, i.e., the (1) complete
disqualification of the felon45, (2) requirement of the disclosure of the prior felony with
consideration given to the ward's best interest46, and (3) silence on the restraint on a felon's
eligibility not addressed in the state's statute.47 As a result of these legal variations and
society’s increase in mobility, the guardianship system is plagued with troubles concerning
forum shopping and deference under full faith and credit. More specifically, to what extent
should a forum court give full faith and credit to a foreign court's guardianship order and/or
48Symposium, Creating the “Portable” Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L. J.
351 (1999).
49ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309(3) (West 2006);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 33-15-6(b), 33-15-44 (2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.020 (West
2006).
50That is, Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and West
Virginia.
51ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-5311 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-5-311(d) (2006); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5 (West 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.059 (West 2006); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A: 4 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2111.03 (West 2006); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit 30, § 4-105 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.210(1) (West 2006);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 678(Vernon 2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-8(a) (West 2006).
52That is, Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia.
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decree.48
II. May a Felon Still be a Guardian?
Because there are three categories of state law concerning the eligibility of persons
with past felony convictions to become guardians, the lack of judicial discretion begs the
question of whether total legislative prohibition of a felon serving as a guardian will
withstand constitutional scrutiny, and whether there are alternatives to such a strict
prohibition.49
The second category includes states that require either divulgence upon the
application to become a guardian or require the court to inquire into any past convictions of
the proposed guardian.50 The states may require the court to consider such convictions when
appointing a guardian, or the states may require automatic disqualification absent proof that
appointment is in the best interests of the incapacitated person.51 Finally, the third category
includes the states whose statutes are silent on this issue.52 Presumably, the silent states
53Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and
Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, EMORY L. J.
(Summer 1992)(noting that unpaid proxies are difficult to find as there is seldom anyone willing
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would allow the court to consider past convictions in relation to the fitness of the guardian or
the best interests of the incapacitated person.
Thus, the effect of a potential guardian’s prior felony conviction ranges from an
outright disqualification of the felon, to a mere legal inconvenience. This lack of uniformity
may create legal quagmires for those guardians appointed in foreign jurisdictions who
relocate the wards to forum jurisdictions that strictly prohibit felons from serving as
guardians. It may also impair those groups where indigency may impact the available
guardianship eligibility pool.
As the demand for eligible guardians increases, and society becoming more mobile,
there will likely be an increase in the factual situation where a potential guardian will not be
appointed in one state, but will be eligible to be appointed in a different state, or vice versa.
There may also be the situation where the guardian has been appointed in a foreign state, and
upon relocating finds himself ineligible to continue to serve as the guardian in the new forum
state. This scenario may create possible forum shopping in situations where the supply of
available guardians is limited. As discussed below, without a uniform guardianship scheme
that considers court discretion, the application of full faith and credit may be inadequate to
overcome the problem.
The prohibition of a felon from serving as a guardian may also impact guardians
when the ward turns the age of majority. What happens in the situation when the only
available guardian is a parent and the parent has a past felony conviction? Is the ward
protected? Typically the public guardianship states have failed to provide adequate
resources for implementation of sufficient guardians to protect the indigent and minority
classes.53
to undertake the task. "A number of states in the United States have public guardians to serve
the indigent, although Florida, for example, has public guardians in only two court circuits.").
54 See generally Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a
Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705 (2003).
55See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult, 11
A.L.R. 4th 956 (1982 & Supp.).
56Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 Yale L.J. 488, 502 n.84 (1988). See also Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 669 (1892).
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Once an existing guardian is prohibited by statute from continuing to act as guardian,
or the felon is the only available guardian, the practitioner must consider whether alternatives
to the appointment of the felon as a guardian are available. Some of the alternatives to be
discussed include minimizing the felony conviction through annulment, dismissal, pardon
and expungement. Other alternatives may include the utilization of durable powers of
attorney.
Outside of forums such as Arkansas, Florida, Rhode Island and Washington that
prohibit felons from serving as guardians, certain steps, taken both inside and outside the
guardianship proceedings may reduce the impact of a prior felony conviction on the
appointment of a guardian.
A. Reducing the Effect of a Prior Felony Conviction: Annulments,
Dismissals, Expunctions and Pardons
Most states have procedures whereby a person may, if certain conditions are met,
have a felony conviction dismissed or annulled,54 or have the records of the conviction
expunged or sealed.55 In addition, the executive branches of the various states have the
power to “pardon” and/or restore convicted felons to their civil rights.56
1. Dismissal/annulment of the felon’s record:
57FED. R .EVID.. 609(c) states that the effect of a pardon, annulment, or certificate of
rehabilitation is not admissible "if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of the
rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent
crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the
conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a
finding of innocence." Even though the conviction may not be admissible, does it have to be
disclosed to the court upon filing an application of guardianship? Candor is very important in
guardianship proceedings. If disclosed on the application, is this "evidence" that is not
admissible to the court to consider in its decision whether to appoint the person as a guardian?
58State ex rel. Gains v. Rossi, 716 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio 1999)(finding that the expungement of a
felony conviction under R.C. 2953.32 and 2953.33 restores a person's competency to hold an
office of honor, trust, or profit).. See also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2)
(2006)("Upon motion of the defendant, if the court finds at the conclusion of the probationary
period that the probation of the defendant has been satisfactory, the court may set the conviction
aside and dismiss the prosecution. The dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as
acquittal, except that the conviction may be considered as a first offense and provide the basis
for subsequent prosecution of the party as a multiple offender, and further shall be considered as
a first offense for purposes of any other law or laws relating to cumulation of offenses. Dismissal
under this Paragraph shall occur only once with respect to any person.").
59 A notable exception to this is Ohio, which allows a petitioner to obtain expunction of
Ohio’s records of a conviction in another state or federal court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2953.32 (West 2006); Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980).
60Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (1980)..
61Allan H. Knickerbocker, Effect of Pardon or of Probation and Dismissal, 31A CAL. JUR. 3D
Evidence §§ 760 (2006).
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If the felon can “un-do” the felony, may he then be appointed as a guardian?57 It is
uncertain what effect a dismissal or annulment of felonies may have for the proposed
guardian.58 Since the remedies of dismissal, expunction or pardon must generally be applied
for in the state or jurisdiction where the conviction was entered,59 there is no guarantee that
once obtained, they will be given deference in that, or other, jurisdictions to make the felon
eligible to serve as a guardian.60
If relief from a felony through dismissal or annulment is obtained, however, it is at
least arguable under the state statutes that are silent as to the effect of the pardon or
annulment, that the relief may qualify a previously ineligible petitioner for guardianship.61 In
62 The four states are Arkansas, Florida, Rhode Island and Washington.
63ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203(a) (West 2006). See also Bailey v. Maxwell, No. CA 05-
700, 2006 WL 476982 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006)(finding that appellant had failed to establish that
she was qualified to serve as guardian because she had presented no testimony that she was
not a convicted and unpardoned felon(emphasis added)).
64Bailey v. Maxwell, No. CA 05-700, 2006 WL 476982 (Ark. Ct. App. March 1, 2006).
65WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.88.020(1)(c) (West 2006).
66U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2006). The general rule appears to be that when a defendant
moves to "expunge" records, she asks that the court destroy or seal the records of the fact of the
defendant's conviction, but she is not removing or vacating the conviction itself. See also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9 (2006).
67 See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006).
68 See Allan H. Knickerbocker, Effect of Pardon or of Probation and Dismissal, 31A CAL.
JUR. 3D Evidence §§ 760 (2006).
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the four states who disqualify those with felony convictions from serving as guardians, the
felon who obtained a pardon or an annulment may be eligible to serve as a guardian in three
of the four states.62
For example, Arkansas allows a person to be a guardian who is “not a convicted and
unpardoned felon . . .”63 The use of the current tense, “not a convicted and unpardoned
felon,” suggests that only currently extant felony convictions would disqualify the potential
guardian.64 The type of felony is not limited in Arkansas, and arguably, the law would apply
to any "pardoned" felony, regardless of its nature.
Likewise, Washington law disqualifies a potential guardianship, “who is … convicted
of a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude."65 Again, it is not the fact of past
conviction but the state of current conviction that disqualifies. Thus, in jurisdictions where a
dismissal is effective to treat the felony as if it never occurred,66 a petitioner who has had a
conviction dismissed upon completion of a successful probation67 or who obtains a pardon68
69LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006).
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309(3) (West 2006).
71R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268 (Fla. 2004) (“A pardon does not eliminate the adjudication
of guilt, creating a fiction that the crime never occurred.”).
72R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-15-6(b)(1) (2005).
73 R.I. GEN LAWS § 33-15-44 (2005).
74Id. See also, Dag Ytreberg, What Constitutes Requisite Conviction--Effect of Expungement of
Conviction, 3A C.J.S. Aliens §§ 1276 (2006).
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would arguably not be disqualified from serving as a guardian in these states.69
In comparison, the language of the Florida statute disqualifies anyone who “has been
convicted of a felony.”70 Under Florida law, a subsequent dismissal of the conviction upon
completion of probation, expunction or sealing of records, or pardon would not eliminate the
fact that the person “has been convicted of a felony.” In fact, similar reasoning has been
employed by the Florida Supreme Court to disqualify the felon from serving, regardless of
the pardon, the annulment or restoration of rights.71
Between these extreme positions lies Rhode Island, which requires a court, before
appointing a guardian, to “find that the individual … [h]as no criminal background which
bears on suitability to serve as guardian,”72 and disqualifies any person convicted of theft
related offenses from serving as a conservator.73 As previously implied, a person who has
successfully achieved a dismissal may not have a “criminal background which bears on
suitability to serve as guardian” since he could argue that he is no longer “convicted of” a
theft-related offense.74
In many situations, the attorney can not forget that there are several possible
impediments to the feasibility of the felon obtaining the remedy of dismissal, expungement
75U.S. v. Vertel, No. 1:91-CR-162, 2006 WL 250672 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2006)(quoting United
States v. Smith, No. 87-3837, 1988 WL 19174, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1988) (no expunction of
valid conviction for which defendant was subsequently pardoned)); United States v. Janik, 10
F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993) (no expunction for soldier concerned about effects on future career
of conviction overturned on Speedy Trial Act grounds, where appellate court held that there
existed constitutionally sufficient evidence to support the conviction); Schwab v. Gallas, 724
F.Supp. 509, 510-11 (N.D.Ohio 1989) (expunction of valid felony conviction not warranted by
the fact that movant had fulfilled the requirements of the sentence and since led a law-abiding
life)). See also United States v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790, 796 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that court
has no authority to expunge a record of a valid conviction absent a legal ground for setting aside
that conviction); United States v. Wiley, 89 F.Supp.2d 909, 911 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (denying
expungement of valid conviction despite the fact that defendant was depressed at the time of the
offense, had been law-abiding since, and was experiencing significant hardship because of past
conviction); United States v. Gallas, 771 F.Supp. 904, 909-10 (W.D.Tenn. 1991) (denying
request for expungement of valid conviction and finding no extraordinary circumstances in
argument that defendant had been law-abiding since the conviction and that his professional
opportunities continued to be hurt by his past conviction)). See also Ex parte Gray, 109 S.W.3d
917 (Tex.Crim. App. 2003).
76 Included in this analysis are only states that either disqualify as guardians persons with
felony convictions or require consideration of such convictions in appointing guardians, and
that also have a statutory framework for annulling or dismissing a felony conviction upon
demonstrating rehabilitation. This limitation is important, because these frameworks for
dismissal or annulment of a felony conviction apply only in the state in which the conviction
occurred.
77 See ARK. CODE ANN. §16-93-303 (West 2006)(allowing court to not enter judgment or
pronounce sentence upon first time offender).
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or annulment.75 Several states impede the dismissal of a felony conviction by requiring the
felon to complete certain rehabilitative prerequisites.76 This includes that the dismissal is
limited to first time offenses.77 Even if the felon may be eligible for a dismissal or
annulment, the state statutes may still prevent certain felons, even if first time offenders,
from serving as guardians. For example, in several states, the type of felony conviction is
important and such offenses are excluded from the framework eligible for dismissals or
78 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(B)(3 & 4) (2006) (excluding convictions for which
sex offense registration is required or in which “sexual motivation” is an element of the
crime); ARK. CODE. ANN. §5-4-311 (excluding sex offenses against minors); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2604(3) (2006) (excluding sex crimes against minors).
79 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(B)(1 & 2) (2006) (excluding convictions involving
the infliction of serious physical injury or use of a deadly or dangerous weapon); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §651:5 (2006) (denying annulment for crimes of violence).
80 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(B)(5) (2006)(excluding convictions where the victim
is under 15 years of age); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §651:5 (2006) (denying annulment for
obstruction of justice or where extended terms of imprisonment apply).
81 See ARK. CODE ANN. §5-4-311 (West 2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2604(3) (2006).
82 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-311 (West 2006) (applicant must have successfully completed
probation); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2604(3) (2006) (same).
83LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 893 D(1)(b)(2) (2006) ("Upon motion of the defendant, if the
court finds at the conclusion of the probationary period that the probation of the defendant has
been satisfactory, the court may set the conviction aside and dismiss the prosecution. The
dismissal of the prosecution shall have the same effect as acquittal, . . . ").
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annulments, e.g., felonies of sexual offenses,78 crimes of violence,79 or other categories of
criminal conduct.80
Additionally, the time to apply for an annulment may be very restrictive. Generally,
the person convicted must qualify for annulment or dismissal at the time of sentencing by
convincing the court to withhold judgment or sentence, i.e., a lack of proof.81 Furthermore,
time is of concern when the eligibility requires that the convicted person successfully
complete probation or other rehabilitative programs, and he remain crime-free for a period of
time thereafter.82
Although dismissal of the conviction has the highest likelihood of removing barriers
to guardianship,83 the procedures are very limited in application. The states that allow the
dismissal or annulment restrict the remedy in application both as to the types of crimes and
84See, e.g., Baker v. State, 884 S.W.2d 603 (Ark. 1994) (defendant who otherwise qualified
for dismissal who failed to object to entry of judgment at time judgment was entered was not
entitled to dismissal of conviction).
85R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1280 (Fla. 2004). Even though a pardon does not eliminate the
adjudication of guilt, creating a fiction that the crime never occurred for guardianship purposes,
the question is unanswered whether a dismissal or annulment may allow the applicant to become
eligible.
86ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-303(b) (West 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(A) (2006);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-311; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2604(3) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§651:5 (2006).
87Each state will make its own independent decision without the adoption of a uniform standard
that applies to this situation.
88ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907(A) (2006); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(c)
(Vernon 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.640(3) (West 2006).
89N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 651:5(X) (2006). See also Tembruell v. City of Seattle, 392 P.2d
453 (Wash. 1964)(the defendant argued that a deferred sentence coupled with dismissal of
the charge did not constitute conviction of a felony, and the court held there being neither an
adjudication of guilt nor a sentence, that the defendant was not convicted of any felony
within the meaning of that phrase in the police pension statute).
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as to the procedural qualifications.84 Of course, these procedures will not benefit a potential
guardian outside of the rather small minority of persons with criminal convictions entitled to
dismissal.85
Assuming that the felon qualifies in the rare instance for an annulment or dismissal of
the felony conviction, under a portion of state statutes, the dismissal of the conviction will be
automatic.86 The question in the subject states that forbid the appointment of felons as
guardians is whether the dismissal or annulment “automatically” lifts a restraint against
being appointed as a guardian.87 Some statutes explicitly indicate that the dismissal of the
conviction will result in removal of all legal disabilities that arose out of the felony
conviction.88 In other states, the legal effect of dismissal is to make the conviction “as if it
never happened.”89 Will that be sufficient to remove the disqualifications of being appointed
90 The scope of this Article is limited to expunction or sealing of records of felony
convictions; it does not address expunction or sealing of related records, such as arrest
records.
91 “Expunge” means to erase or destroy, and to expunge a criminal conviction is to remove it
from the record. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 621 (8th ed. 2004).
92 Some statutes use expunction and sealing interchangeably. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
1.3-1(2) (2005).
93Most state guardianship statutes are silent about felony convictions, and say very little about
annulled, dismissed, expunged or pardoned felonies or the effects of the mitigated conviction.
What little reference is made in state statutes is inferred, i.e., "a guardian who is not a convicted
and unpardoned felon (emphasis added). . ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203(a) (West 2006);
This seems to imply that a "pardoned" felon will be eligible to seek the appointment as a
guardian. On the other hand, in the case of U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006), the
general rule appears to be that when a defendant moves to "expunge" records, she asks that the
court destroy or seal the records of the fact of the defendant's conviction, but she is not removing
or vacating the conviction itself. See also U.S. v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004); ARIZ.
REV.STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2006); LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental
Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001).
94LeRoy L. Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the
Provision of Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001).
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as a guardian?
2. Expungement and the Sealing of the Felon’s Record
Another option,90 different than dismissal, is to have the record of the conviction
expunged91 or sealed.92 Unlike the argument that dismissal or annulment makes the
conviction as if it never happened, the effect under most state statutory schemes of an
expungement is that it does not remove the conviction.93 An expungement is simply a
request by the defendant seeking the court destroy or seal the records of the conviction; it
does not absolve the conviction itself.94
a. The Process of Obtaining Expunction or Sealing of Record of
Conviction
If the felon is otherwise qualified to apply for an expungement of record, he may be
95 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245(2)(b) and (3) (West 2005) (requiring notice to court,
which notifies law enforcement agencies); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(B) (West 2006)
(court must notify prosecutor); R.I. GEN LAWS § 12-1.3-3(a) (2005) (applicant must notify
attorney general and police department).
96U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir.2006)(finding that a federal court has jurisdiction over
petitions for expungement of criminal records in narrow circumstances: where the validity of the
underlying criminal proceeding is challenged). See also Ex parte M.R.R., No. 07-05-0294-CV,
2006 WL 1547764 (Tex. Crim. App. June 7, 2006) (where the court was found to have no
inherent or equitable power to expunge criminal records, but any authority was dependent upon
expunction statutes); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01 (Vernon 2006). But see State v.
A.C.H., 710 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that the district court has the authority
to grant expungement of criminal records statutorily and through its inherent power); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609A.02 (West 2006).
97 See MINN .STAT. ANN. §§ 609A.02 (3) (West 2006).
98State v. L.W.J., No. A05-207, 2006 WL 1985491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). See also State v.
H.A., 716 N.W.2d 360 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)(noting that a district court's authority to issue
expungement orders affecting court records is limited to: (1) when the petitioner's constitutional
rights may be seriously infringed by retention of petitioner's records; and (2) when a petitioner's
constitutional rights are not involved, but the court determines that expungement will yield a
benefit to the petitioner commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination
of the record and the burden on the court in issuing, enforcing and monitoring an expungement
order); Jones v. St. Louis County Police Dep’t, 133 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (finding
that courts have limited power to equitably expunge records to cases involving illegal
prosecution, acquittal, or extraordinary circumstances).
99Toia v. People, 776 N.E.2d 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (stating an individual is eligible for
expungement only where the legislature has authorized expungement). See also People v. Thon,
746 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding the Governor is constitutionally empowered to
grant pardon, but the power to expunge is controlled by statute; an individual is eligible for
expungement only where the legislature has authorized expungement); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
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required before requesting expunction from a court, to notify appropriate law enforcement or
prosecutorial agencies.95 Similar to the requirements for dismissal and annulment of the
felony conviction, expungement may have significant impediments to the feasibility of
receiving relief from the conviction.96 For example, as in Minnesota,97 if the defendant
pleads guilty, he may not receive an expungement of records due to the guilty plea.98
Additionally, expungement is typically a legislative prerogative, rather than a judicial
decision.99 The expungement in most states is limited to a single incident of criminal
ANN. 2630/5 (West 2006); Compare Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214 (10th
Cir. 2001)(noting that courts have inherent equitable authority to order the expungement of an
arrest record or a conviction in rare or extreme instances.).
100 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C)(1)(a) (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2(a)
(2005).
101 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245(5) (West 2005) (preventing sealing of records
related to crimes against children and sexual crimes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-1(1) (defining
“crime of violence” to include several violent and sexual crimes); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-
2(a) (disqualifying convictions for “crime of violence”).
102See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245(1) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.32(A)(1) (West 2006)(must wait three years); R.I. GEN. LAWS §12-1.3-2(c) (2005)
(ten years).
103See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245(4) (West 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2953.32(C)(1)(b) (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3(b)(1) (2005).
104OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C)(2) (West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3(b) (2005).
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conduct or a first time offense.100 As in dismissals of felony convictions, certain convictions
related to crimes, including sex offenses, domestic violence and other crimes of violence, are
not eligible for expunction of the conviction record.101
Another impediment on the ability of the proposed guardian to obtain an
expungement is that the applicant for expunction may have to wait a certain period of time
after final discharge related to the conviction before he is eligible to apply for an
expungement,102 the logic being that the existence of pending criminal matters will also
disqualify an applicant for expunction under some expunction statutes, as the felon would
not be able to enjoy the expungement of the first felony, to in turn only be convicted of a
subsequent felony.103
Finally, a common sense restraint, if not expressed, at least implied, is that the
expunction statutes also require a balancing approach and the weighing of the interests of the
state against the interests of the applicant.104 Hence, like the dismissal of felony convictions,
105Vitauts M. Gulbis, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult, 11 A.L.R.4TH
956 (1982).
106OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.32(C)(2) (West 2006) (treat as if conviction never
occurred), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.33(B) (West 2006) (person restored to all rights
and may generally not be questioned about conviction); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-4(b) (2005)
(person may state that they have never been convicted); State v. Davisson, 624 N.W.2d 292
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (finding of guilty is equivalent to a plea of guilty for purposes of
expungement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02, subd. 5, 609A.02 et seq (West 2006).
107NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.245 (West 2005).
108U.S. v. Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004).
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expungement is not easily obtained, and there are many impediments to achieving the
expungement.
b. The Effect of Expunction or Sealing upon Requirement to
Report Conviction or Qualification for Guardian Status
Once the felon obtains the expungement, is he automatically eligible to serve as a
judicially appointed guardian? The effects of an expunction may vary from state to state.105
In some states, the expunction of the felony means that the conviction must legally be treated
as never having occurred.106 Other state statutes do not specify what effect expunction or
sealing of the conviction has on the person’s ability to seek appointment as a guardian.107 If
the felony is treated as having never happened, do the state’s guardianship statutes
automatically allow the person to serve as a guardian if that is the only impediment to
eligibility?
In the jurisdictions that treat expungements as procedures for sealing records only,
arguably, an expungement will not make an otherwise disqualified guardian qualified since
the expungement is only the sealing of the record, and not the erasing of the conviction.108 In
certain jurisdictions, the felons conviction must not only be expunged in order to make him
109State v. Hanes, 137 Idaho 40, 44 P.3d 295 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002)(defendant's conviction
resulted in the loss of the defendant's civil rights because of the operation of Article VI, Section
3 of the Idaho Constitution. A defendant who has been convicted must seek the expungement of
his conviction , which is an extraordinary remedy, and is denied to probationers who have been
adjudicated to be in violation of the terms of their probation. Section 3.disqualifies persons from
acting as guardians who been convicted of a felony, and have not been restored to the rights of
citizenship. When the court withholds the imposition of judgment and places the defendant on
probation, the defendant has not lost his rights of citizenship under Article VI, Section 3 because
the defendant has not been convicted of a felony. It is clear that upon completion of probation
the suspension of the defendant's civil rights is lifted and the defendant is automatically "restored
to the full rights of citizenship" upon satisfactory completion of probation).
110Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 502 n.84 (1988). See also Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
111Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 502 n.84 (1988). See also Huntington v. Attrill, 146
U.S. 657, 669 (1892).
112 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-607(b)(1) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.03
(West 2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-10-1 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.885(1)
(West 2006).
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eligible to act as guardian, but he will need to have his "citizenship" rights restored too.109
The more difficult question is whether the guardian applicant has to disclose the
"expunged" conviction on his guardianship application in order to show good faith and
candor before the court?
3. Obtaining a Pardon from the Felony Conviction
The governors or panels within the executive branches of the various states have the
power to fully or partially pardon those convicted of felonies.110 Pardon is an executive act
reserved for the governor or some other agency in the executive branch.111 Application must
usually be made to the governor, a board, or a commission.112 Many states grant the
pardoning power through statutes, while other states argue it’s a decision that may be made
in conjunction with the courts after balancing the interests of society and law enforcement’s
113U.S. v. Sutton, 521 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1975)(holding that ". . .Congress has the power to
accord a state pardon differing in effects that are in differing contexts, depending on its
objectives in creating the disqualification. Neither the inherent nature of a pardon nor full faith
and credit require that a state pardon automatically relieve federal disabilities." in Thrall v.
Wolfe, 503 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S.Ct. 1392, 1(975)).
114Alan Ellis & Peter J. Scherr, Federal Felony Conviction, Collateral Civil Disabilities, 11
CRIM. JUST. 42 (Fall 1996). See also People v. Ansell, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 145 (2001); Dixon v.
McMullen, 527 F.Supp. 711 (N.D. Tex. 1981)(noting that a pardon implies guilt, Texas courts
may forgive, but they do not forget, the fact is not obliterated and there is no "wash").
115People v. Ansell, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 145 (Cal. 2001) (referencing Raymond C. Brown,
Requirement for Rehabilitation Certificate, 65 OPS.CAL.ATTY.GEN. 232, 233-234 (1982) and
Mosk, Certificates of Rehabilitation and the New Pardon Procedure 18 STATE BAR J. 172, 173-5
(1943)).
116Barbour v. Democratic Executive Comm.of Crawford County, 269 S.E.2d 433 (Ga. 1980).
See also People v. Ansell, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2001) (rejecting the suggestion that absent
section 4852.01(d), a certificate of rehabilitation was necessarily available to any convicted
felon who claimed to meet the minimum statutory requirements and was otherwise eligible to
apply, and stating that under the California procedure, the superior court conducts a thorough
inquiry into the applicant's conduct and character from the time of the underlying crimes through
the time of the certificate of rehabilitation proceeding and affirms that the standards for
determining whether rehabilitation has occurred are high. The decision whether to grant relief
based on the evidence is discretionary in nature.); William J. Violet, Presidental [sic] Pardo
Relief and its Relationship to Federal Firearm Disability, 77 N.D. L. REV. 419, 420 (2001).
117 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-607(b)(1) (West 2006); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§9.94A.885(1) (West 2006).
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need for the information.113 The typical statutory scheme that allows for the consideration of
a pardon requires the felon's rehabilitation,114 a waiting period,115 and the pardon to be in
harmony with Constitutional law.116
a. The Process of obtaining a Pardon
The process generally used in obtaining a pardon requires the felon to provide notice
to the victims and the prosecuting and law enforcement agencies that obtained the
conviction.117 Because pardons are usually exclusively executive decisions, the executive
118J. C. W., Pardon as Affecting Previous Offenses or Punishment Therefor, 57 A.L.R. 443
(1928).
119 See Plemmons, “Lobbying Activities” and Presidential Pardons: Will Legislators’ Efforts
to Amend the LDA Lead to Increasingly Hard-Lined Jurisprudence?, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 131,
148-49 (2003) (discussing President Clinton’s pardon of Marc Rich after extensive lobbying
by Rich’s wife).
120 See generally Gary L. Hall, Pardon as Restoring Public Office or License or Eligibility
Therefore, 58 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1974 and Supp.). See also, U.S. v. Matassini, 565 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1978). In Fields v. State, 85 So.2d 609, 610-11 (Fla. 1956), the court squarely held
that a felony conviction for which the offender has received a full and unconditional pardon
cannot be counted as a prior felony conviction under the provisions of our habitual offender
laws. . . The court was careful to note, however, that its opinion did not preclude the
legislature from making pardoned convictions the basis for punishment under habitual
offender statutes. Rather, the court stated that inasmuch as the Legislature did not expressly
include pardoned convictions in the Act, it is taken as evidencing an intention on the part of
the Legislature of this State that pardoned convictions not be counted as prior "live" felony
convictions.
121See R.J.L. v. State, 887 So.2d 1268, 1281 (Fla.. 2004) (“While a pardon removes the legal
consequences of a crime, it does not remove the historical fact that the conviction occurred; a
pardon does not mean that the conviction is gone.”). See also Laura Dietz, et al., Effect of
Pardon, Commutation, or Probation, 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 882 (2006).
122 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(a) (West 2006).
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branch may be vested with the complete discretion of granting or denying the request.118 If
the decision is purely under the control of the executive branch, the determination may turn
on political considerations rather than on the merits.119
b. The Legal Effect of a Pardon
Because a pardon does not consummate in a finding of absence of guilt, a pardon
does not necessarily erase a conviction.120 Hence, in some jurisdictions, a pardon alone, like
an expungement, may not assist a proposed guardian, since the conviction is not reversed.121
A pardon may, however, make an individual eligible for expunction of records of
convictions122 or restore that person to the same rights as if the conviction had not
123 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (West 2006). See also People v. Ansell, 108
Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2001) (California Section 4853 states, in pertinent part, "In all cases in
which a full pardon has been granted by the Governor of this state . . .shall operate to restore
to the convicted person, all the rights, privileges, and franchises of which he or she has been
deprived in consequence of that conviction or by reason of any matter involved therein."
Note, however, that CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.15 (West 2006) provides that a certificate of
rehabilitation does not compel reinstatement of any license, permit, or certificate needed "to
practice or carry on any profession or occupation," including the practice of medicine or
law).
124 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-605(c) (West 2006) (no expunction of records of
conviction where victim under age 18, for sex offenses, or for offenses resulting in death or
serious injury).
125Supra. generally.
126State v. Tumblin, 868 So.2d 902 (5th Cir. 2004)(holding the trial court was not authorized to
expunge defendant's felony conviction since his sentence was "imposed," not deferred, and thus,
he was not eligible to have his sentence dismissed, which was a prerequisite to expungement);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:9(E)(1)(b) (2006)..
127 See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 959 P.2d 465, 468 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (dismissal and
expunction of records is “extraordinary remedy”).
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occurred.123 Such remedies, however, may not be available in all cases.124 If they are
available, as in the discussion above under expungement of records, certain states may find
the pardoned felon eligible to serve as a guardian, while others will not.125
4. Summary for the Mitigation of the Conviction
Although the above remedies are options that may be explored in jurisdictions where
a past felony conviction will either disqualify a person from serving as a guardian or must be
considered by the appointing court, review of the authority allowing these procedures shows
the potential mitigations to be of limited application and utility.
Pursuing a dismissal, expunction or pardon may not be a feasible option to many.126
The possibility of actually obtaining the dismissal, expunction or pardon is questionable, as
these are extraordinary remedies in most states.127 The remedy may require legislative
128United States v Salleh, 863 F Supp. 283 (E.D. Va. 1994) (finding that Virginia did not have a
statutory basis for allowing the expungement of the felony records and it did not find other
circumstances warranting such relief).
129See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Judicial Expunction of Criminal Record of Convicted Adult,
11 A.L.R.4TH 956 (1982). See also United States v Noonan, 906 F2d 952 (3rd Cir. 1990)(Even
though the defendant had received a presidential pardon, he was not entitled to expunction of his
court records relating to his conviction, since the court found that any attempt by the President to
pardon the defendant and to compel expunction of the judicial records would violate the
separation of powers doctrine. The court also found that the presidential pardon would not
eradicate a defendant's guilt so as to justify expunction of his criminal record.).
130Most state guardianship statutes are silent about felony convictions, and say very little about
annulled, dismissed, expunged or pardoned felonies or the effects of the mitigated conviction.
What little reference is made in state statutes is inferred, i.e., "a guardian who is not a convicted
and unpardoned felon (emphasis added) . . ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-203(a)(West 2006).
This seems to imply that a "pardoned" felon will be eligible to seek the appointment as a
guardian. On the other hand, in the case of U.S. v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006), the
general rule is that "expungd" records, do not remove or vacate the conviction itself; U.S. v.
Crowell, 374 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (2006); LeRoy L.
Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health Specialty Courts in the Provision of
Therapeutic Justice for Mentally Ill Offenders, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2001).
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approval under statutory authority,128 and may be required to be pursued in the state where
the conviction was entered, which may be different than the current residence of the potential
guardian and the state where the guardianship is sought.129 Finally, even if relief is obtained
through one of the remedies, it is not a guarantee that the probate court will view the
dismissed, expunged or pardoned felony as removing the barriers to appointment, since the
act of expungement or pardoning does not remove the conviction; rather, the defendant is
seeking that the court destroy or seal the records of the conviction and not the conviction
itself.130
Despite the potential remedies a felon may attempt to pursue, taking into
consideration whether the felon possesses the resources to pay the legal costs of seeking said
remedies, to become an eligible guardian, the feasibility of using the alternatives of
dismissal, annulment, expungement, sealing, or pardon are not realistic to the general
131See infra Table in Appendix A.
132Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (Fall 2001); Anne E. Melley, Powers of Attorney, 3 AM.
JUR. 2D Agency § 21 (May 2006); Judith C. Ensor, Awilda R. Marquez & Kathryn A. Turner,
Development in Maryland Law, 1985-86: IX. Property, 46 MD. L. REV. 801, 818-20 (Spring
1987).
133Anne E. Melley, Powers of Attorney, 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 21 (May 2006).
134Anne E. Melley, Duration and Termination of Agency, 3 Am Jur 2d Agency § 55 (May
2006).
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population. This is especially significant to the indigent and vulnerable groups. Hence,
groups, such as those with a higher percentage of felonies, and/or the impoverished, may
need to seek other, more affordable alternatives. What other alternatives may be available?
Hopefully, if the ward was competent at some point of his or her life, he or she executed a
“durable” power of attorney.
B. Seeking Alternatives to Guardianship: The Durable Power of Attorney
Many states, under statute, allow a person who possesses capacity (Athe prospective
ward@ or "the principal") the ability to chose a person to make temporal decisions for them
under a power of attorney (Athe attorney-in-fact@).131 Generally, the attorney-in-fact, as an
agent, acts on behalf of the principal to accomplish the principal’s purposes.132 The agent=s
authority and ability to act is limited to what the principal may undertake.133 If the principal
is unable to act due to incapacity, under a “general power of attorney,” the agent=s ability to
act is likewise restrained.134
Many states, however, have expanded the ability of the agent to act, and therefore,
not only allow a general power of attorney, but provide for a specialized power of attorney
that is Adurable.@ The Adurability@ of a durable power of attorney enhances a general power
of attorney and allows the agent of the principal to continue acting in the principal=s name,
135Anne E. Meley, Powers of Attorney 3 AM JUR 2D Agency § 26 (May 2006); 20 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5604(b) (West 2006).
136Robert Craig Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 519, 522-24 (Spring 1990); Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the
Elderly: Is the Solution a Problem?, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 282-88 (Winter 2003);
Sean W. Scott, Incapacity Plan, http://www.virtuallawoffice.com/incapacity.html (last visited
Aug. 17, 2006). Note that the filing of a guardianship may suspend the use of the durable
power of attorney.
137Robert Craig Waters, Florida Durable Power of Attorney Law: The Need For Reform, 17 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 519, 522-23 (Spring 1990).
138Michael Palermo, Powers of Attorney, http://elder-law.lawyers.com/Powers-of-Attorney.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2006); Milton Berry Scott, General Durable Power of Attorney,
http://www.mbscott.com/powatt.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
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even in the situation where the principal has subsequently become incapacitated and unable
to make important decisions.135
Since a validly executed durable power of attorney allows the agent to continue
acting on the principal=s behalf after the principal becomes incapacitated, the written grant of
authority is a substitute for appointing a guardian under guardianship statutes.136 The durable
power of attorney, if valid, is an exceptional alternative to a guardianship in most situations.
As discussed below, however, there is an increased ability by dishonest attorney-in-facts to
exploit the agency authorization given under a durable power of attorney.
1. Advantages of a Durable Power of Attorney over a Guardianship
Appointment
The durable power of attorney has many advantages over a guardianship, including
the ability of the agent to act quickly and without pre-judicial scrutiny.137 The significant
impediments to the utilization of the durable powers of attorney tend to originate from the
financial and brokerage institutions' reluctance to honor the agency, and not due to
limitations on its use through statutes, common law or inadequate drafting.138 Due to the
139Christy Holmes, Comment, Surrogate Decisionmaking in the 90s: Learning to Respect
Our Elders, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 605, 607-12 (Spring 1997); Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as
Agent Under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 NEB. L. REV.
574, 588-95 (1996).
140Elaine Hightower Gagliardi, Estate Planning Goals, 3-36 MODERN ESTATE PLANNING § 36.15
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2006).
141Christy Holmes, Comment, Surrogate Decisionmaking in the 90s: Learning to Respect
Our Elders, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 605, 608-10 (Spring 1997); Christina Walsh, Comment, A
Costly Application of Strict Statutory Construction: The Ohio Supreme Court’s
Interpretation of Ohio’s Nonademption Statute, Revised Code Section 2107.501(B), 28 U.
TOL. L. REV. 631, 646 (Spring 1997); Mark Fowler, Note, Appointing an Agent to Make
Medical Treatment Choices, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1025-27 (May 1984).
142Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of “Family” in Proxy
Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1054-55 (Apr. 1990).
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advantages of expediency, the use of the durable power of attorney is also subject to a greater
risk of abuse and exploitation by the agent than in a traditional guardianship that is
supervised by the court.139
One advantage of a written power of attorney is that the principal or ward decides,
while having capacity, who will be the principal=s surrogate decision-maker rather than said
decision being made after incapacity by a statute or a court.140 In contrast, a petition for the
appointment of a guardian places the duty to make the decision of appointing an agent on the
judicial body pursuant to a petition and statutory requirements rather than at the principal's
discretion.141 The court accepts evidence and makes a determination of who should be the
guardian based on statutory prerequisites. Furthermore, state statutes may establish the
priority of surrogate decision makers, and such a person appointed under a statutory priority
may not be the principal=s first choice.142 Another advantage of a durable power of attorney
is that it is not subject to the regular and statutorily required judicial review that a court
143Michael A. Kirtland, Estate Planning For Protected Persons, 65 ALA. LAW. 404, 407 (Nov.
2004).
144REBECCA BERG & KAREN CAMPBELL, FLORIDA GUARDIANSHIP: A RESOURCE FOR
FAMILIES DEALING WITH ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE, 5-6 http://alzonline.phhp.ufl.edu/en/
reading/guardian.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
145Id.
146FLA STAT. ANN. § 744.3215(4), 744.3725 (West 2006).
147Adrienne Noble Nacev & Jeremy Rettig, A Survey of Key Issues in Kentucky Elder Law, 29
N. KY. L. REV. 139, 159-60 (2002).
148Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary
Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (Fall 2001).
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appointed guardian is subject to.143 Most state statutes require the guardian to prepare an
inventory and to make an appearance or an accounting on an annual basis.144
Additionally, the agent under a power of attorney is typically not required to provide
accountings or reporting of the disposition of the principal=s assets. In contrast, a guardian is
under a statutory duty to make such reportings, obtain prior court approval before dissipating
assets, and to possibly post a bond.145 Furthermore, the attorney-in-fact has more discretion
to make decisions quickly, and also on matters that a guardian may not be allowed to make,
due to court supervision and statutory restraints.146 Typically, guardianships are more
restricted and receive more scrutiny from the courts as compared to an attorney-in-fact acting
independently of the judiciary's observations.147
2. The Risks Inherent in a Durable Power of Attorney
Perhaps at the risk of stating the obvious, the disadvantage of a durable power of
attorney is that the agent may more easily abuse or exploit the principal since the agent under
a power of attorney may act quickly, with less statutory restraints, and without judicial
review.148 As a result, the temptation and opportunity to exploit and abuse the principal and
149See generally infra. Appendix A.
150Anne M. H. Foley, Judicial Appointment of Guardian, 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward §
65 (2006). See also, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.542 (West 2006).
151See infra Appendix A.
152Id.
153The statutes are generally silent on whether a criminal may be an attorney-in-fact, but have
instead adopted a "best interest of the principal requirement" as consistent with the fiduciary
duties that courts have historically imposed on attorneys-in-fact. "[A] power of attorney ... is
clearly given with the intent that the attorney-in-fact will utilize that power for the benefit of the
principal." Mantella v. Mantella, 268 A.D.2d 852 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). Because "[t]he
relationship of an attorney-in-fact to his principal is that of agent and principal, ... the attorney-
in-fact must act in the utmost good faith and undivided loyalty toward the principal, and must act
in accordance with the highest principles of morality, fidelity, loyalty and fair dealing."
Semmler v. Naples, 166 A.D.2d 751 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
154Bailey v. Maxwell, No. CA 05-700, 2006 WL 476982 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that
the appellant had not shown that she was qualified to serve as guardian because she offered
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the principal=s assets are more accessible.
3. Distinguishing Characteristics
In most, if not all jurisdictions in the United States, the guardianship is commenced
when the proposed guardian initiates the proceedings with a petition.149 The potential
guardian provides personal information with the petition for the court to consider before
appointing the applicant as the guardian.150 The petition may inquire as to the guardian=s
fitness, including whether the guardian has been convicted of a felony.151
One of the most significant differences between a court appointed guardian and an
attorney in fact selected by the principal is that when choosing a surrogate decision maker,
the principal will generally not do a “background@ check, or require an application
prerequisite for the selection of the attorney-in-fact.152 Anyone who qualifies under the
power of attorney statutes may serve as an attorney-in-fact, regardless of their criminal
history.153 Such process is not typical for a guardianship appointment.154
no testimony stating that she was not a convicted and unpardoned felon); ARK.CODE ANN. §§
§§ 28-65-210(3) & 28-65-203(a) (West 2006).
155VALERIE J. BRADLEY & NANCY SULLIVAN, THE FORGOTTEN GENERATION-1999 REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION 4 (1999)("The fact
that access to specialized mental retardation/developmental disabilities services remain so very
inadequate for individuals with lifelong disabilities who live in lower socioeconomic
households--which includes disproportionately people from racial and ethnic minorities--can be
traced to assumption in the 1960s about conquering the social ills of poverty.")
156Id. at 15. "However, this older generation remains vulnerable to poverty, often not being able
to afford adequate health care just when health needs increase dramatically. . . .With the current
anti-welfare mentality, people with mild developmental disabilities are most vulnerable to being
abandoned by governmental agencies that search for less inclusive definitions of what
constitutes need. How many people fall into this hidden population? the truth is that we have no
idea.. . . without action, the situation will continue."
157Alison Patrucco Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A reevaluation of Autonomy and
Beneficence for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L. J.
(Summer 1992)("With unpaid proxies, however, there is seldom anyone willing to undertake the
task.")
158Florida has an absolute ban for appointing a felon as a guardian, regardless of the
circumstances.
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The durable power of attorney is also problematic in many situations since it may not
be feasible for the ward to have prepared the document. In certain instances, it is not
available, like when the ward has not enjoyed capacity,155 or when the power of attorney was
not timely executed before incapacity. Again, the classes most affected and impacted are the
indigent, because of their lack of financial resources to have such instruments prepared, and
those who do not have capacity to prepare the document, i.e., those with marginal capacity.156
In such cases where powers of attorney are not executed, and the ward does not have
an estate, it may be difficult to exercise the the guardianship alternative.157 If the proposed
guardian, frequently a family member, has a felony conviction, in certain states, the ward
may be denied adequate choices of substitute decision-makers.158
When the power of attorney is not a feasible alternative, and assuming that being
159http://www.guardianship.org/ See also Symposium, Creating the “Portable”
Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate
Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L. J. 351 (1999).
160 Legal Encyclopedia, Uniform Probate Code, http://www.answers.com/topic/uniform-
probate-code (last visited Aug. 17, 2006).
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appointed the guardian was accomplishable, if the guardian relocates the ward, and transfers
the guardianship matter, it is questionable whether the courts in the forum jurisdiction will
exercise full faith and credit of prior adjudications of incapacity and the appointment of a
guardian. Certain states, some of which contain high concentrations of our elderly
population, may choose the alternative that denies felons the right to be guardians under any
circumstances. Which alternative is best suited for an aging population or the indigent ward?
III. Should Legislation be Uniform Among the States?
A. Generally
In response to the lack of consistency in the implementation of statutory guardianship
schemes among the states, federal legislators and independent organizations have created and
promoted various uniform guardianship models and standards in an attempt to bring
consistency among the different guardianship statutes.159 Although not binding or
mandatory, they serve as guides for state legislatures and encourage uniform application
among the states.160 In all cases, the uniform schemes that have been presented are
insufficient as they do not provide for judicial discretion when determining whether the
appointment of the guardian is in the ward's best interest. The states' statutory regiments are
inconsistently applied and each state ranges from little or no consideration of the felony to
complete restraints against the felon's eligibility to serve as a guardian.
1. Uniform Standards
Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted guardianship
161See infra Table in Appendix A.
162Law by Source: Uniform Laws, Uniform Probate Code Locator (2003)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html.
163For example, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Uniform Probate Code and the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act. See infra Table in Appendix A.
164Anne M. H. Foley, Collateral Attack, 39 AM. JUR. 2D Guardian and Ward § 74 (2006)(". . .the
appointment of a guardian cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, (cites omitted) unless
the proceedings show upon their face that the court was without jurisdiction to make the order of
appointment. (cites omitted)). Thus, the title of the guardian cannot be collaterally attacked
because of mere irregularities in the appointment or in the underlying proceedings. Board of
Children's Guardians of Marion County v. Shutter, 34 N.E. 665 (Ind. 1893).
165 Symposium, Creating the “Portable” Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L. J. 351,
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statutes, most states have been reluctant in adopting a national uniform standard.161 For
example, currently only eighteen of the fifty states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code
("UPC"), while the majority have adopted statutes inconsistent with other states' statutory
schemes.162
This article does not discuss the tensions that inherently exist between the federal
system and its interaction with the states’ sovereignty, but it is not unusual for states to adopt
uniform laws and adapt them to the state’s individual needs.163 If a uniform statutory scheme
has not been adopted, or if the “uniformity” fails to address particular issues, such as whether
felons may be eligible guardians, will forum states give deference to a foreign state’s
judgments and decrees under the United States Constitution or other legislative provisions?
2. Full Faith and Credit
The question remains, to what extent must the forum state honor a prior guardianship
order where a guardianship has already been established in one state and the ward moves to a
different jurisdiction?164 Jurisdictions appear to provide different levels of full faith and
credit165 when honoring and giving deference to the enforcement of the foreign jurisdiction’s
fn12 (1999).






order. Some states appear to honor the foreign judgment carte blanc, while other
jurisdictions enforce the foreign judgment with conditions and considerations of the forum
state’s guardianship requirements.
a. Full Credit
In the case of Pulley v. Sandgren,166 Bryan Pulley had been living with his father, Mr.
Pulley in Boonville, Missouri when, in November 1993, at age seventeen, Bryan was
involved in a serious automobile accident and suffered a permanent brain injury.167 A few
weeks after the accident, Bryan moved to Michigan with his mother, Mrs. Sandgren, to allow
Bryan to be eligible for medical rehabilitation treatments in Michigan.168 In 1994, the
Michigan probate court appointed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian following his
eighteenth birthday. Bryan continued to live with his mother for several years and she
served as the payee for Bryan’s social security benefits.169
In 1998, Mrs. Sandgren and Bryan moved to Virginia. In Virginia, Mrs. Sandgren
was unhappy with Bryan's rehabilitative progress, and thereafter, Bryan returned to live with
Mr. Pulley in Missouri. In October 2003, Mr. Pulley petitioned the Missouri court to register
the foreign Michigan guardianship order, and the guardianship case was transferred to
Missouri on August 24, 2004.170 On December 9, 2004, the Missouri court entered a
171Id.
172FLA. STAT. ANN. §§744.306, 744.308 (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §764-A:44 (2006);
TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §881 (Vernon 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-11-117(b)(1) (West 2006);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44A-1-12(a) (West 2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, §29A-5-114 (2006); MO.
ANN. STAT. §475.055(3) (West 2006).
173Pulley v. Sandgren, No. WD 64966, 2006 WL 1222734 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006). See also 4
U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2006) (Missouri courts are obligated to give full faith and credit to a foreign
state's judicial proceedings unless the order or judgment was obtained by fraud or was void for
lack of jurisdiction.).
174Pulley v. Sandgren, No. WD 64966, 2006 WL 1222734 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006).
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judgment that removed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian and the court appointed Mr.
Pulley as Bryan’s successor guardian. Mrs. Sandgren appealed Mr. Pulley's appointment in
the Missouri court.171
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court was obligated to give full faith
and credit to the Michigan order that had appointed Mrs. Sandgren as Bryan's guardian.172
Generally, in Missouri, and similar jurisdictions, the states interpret the United States
Constitution, Article 4, § 1, as making it mandatory for the forum jurisdiction to give full
faith and credit to a foreign state’s guardianship orders, absent allegations of fraud or the
foreign jurisdiction’s lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction. 173
The Missouri court not only gave the Michigan order deference, but held that with
respect to a foreign order or judgment, the courts in Missouri must presume that the foreign
court had jurisdiction and that it rendered a valid judgment in accordance with its laws.174
In such jurisdictions, as Missouri, that provide complete deference to the foreign
jurisdiction’s orders and decrees, the forum state is precluded from making any inquiry into
the merits of the underlying case, but is instead, required to accept the order “free from
questioning the logic or consistency of the decision, or the validity of the legal principles
175Id.




upon which it is based.”175
Arguably, if a foreign jurisdiction allowed a felon to be appointed as a guardian, and
the guardian then relocated to the State of Missouri, the Missouri courts would not question
the guardian’s eligibility or appointment under Missouri’s standards, absent allegations of
fraud or lack of jurisdiction. One may question whether without an uniform application of
guardianship laws, such a policy is always in the best interest of the ward or whether such a
policy encourages forum shopping.
b. Partial Credit
Yet, how much deference must the forum court allow? In the case of In re
Guardianship of Replogle, Elizabeth Replogle, the ward, a 41-year-old developmentally
challenged adult, resided in Indiana for most of her life. Elizabeth's mother, Ms. Zierer, had
been appointed Elizabeth's guardian under an Indiana guardianship order.176 After the
appointment as guardian, Ms. Zierer moved Elizabeth to Ohio. Several years later, in
January 2004, Elizabeth’s sister, Nancy Smith, filed a petition in the Indiana court seeking to
have Zierer removed as Elizabeth's guardian.177 Ms. Smith’s petition alleged that Ms. Zierer
abused Elizabeth, and Elizabeth was moved to a nursing home facility in Ohio without notice
to, or approval of, the Indiana court.178
Following Elizabeth Replogle's removal to Ohio, proceedings were initiated in
Indiana seeking her return to that state. On May 25, 2004, the Indiana court, after holding a
179Id. at 332-333.
180Id. at 333.
181Id. at 334 (Smith argued that the trial court was required to give preclusive effect to the
Indiana judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Section 1, Article IV of the United
States Constitution. The court found that the forum state was not required under the Clause to
give the foreign judgment more preclusive effect than it would have in the rendering state.);
Kovacs v. Brewer (1958), 356 U.S. 604 (1958) (because a guardianship order is obviously
modifiable in the rendering state, it is necessarily modifiable in the forum state).
182In re Guardianship of Replogle, 841 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005); In re Prye, 169 S.W.3d
116 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); In re Guardianship of Jane E.P., 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005).
183Teresa L. v. Sauk County, 514 N.W.2d 424 (Wis. Ct. App.1993).
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hearing, entered an order requiring Ms. Zierer to return Elizabeth to Indiana. Immediately
thereafter, Jennie Lee Clark filed the guardianship action in Ohio. Clark asked the court to
appoint her as Elizabeth's guardian.179 The court appointed Clark as the emergency guardian
of Elizabeth for a limited time. Ms. Smith then filed a motion with the Ohio court, seeking
to have the court give full faith and credit to the Indiana guardianship and seeking the
termination of the Ohio guardianship. The Ohio trial court, pursuant to Ms. Smiths request,
entered an order terminating the Ohio guardianship.180
On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals held that under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution, despite the fact that the Indiana guardianship order could be modified in
Indiana, Ohio was not required to give the foreign judgment more preclusive effect than
would be consistent under Ohio law.181 Hence, in Ohio, the full faith and credit clause did
not require the Ohio court to give the Indiana order carte blanc deference and enforcement,
but the Ohio court required the full faith and credit deference in enforcing the Indiana order
with no more preclusive effect than the order would have had in Ohio.182
Consider further the case of Teresa L. v. Sauk County,183 where the Wisconsin court
184FLORIDA STAT. ANN. §§ 744.467 and 744.474 (West 2006).
185Teresa L. v. Sauk County, 514 N.W.2d. at 425.
186Id.
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found that the judiciary may modify a foreign order appointing a guardian despite the full
faith and credit clause.184 Teresa and Jimmie were divorced in the summer of 1992, and in
January 1993, Jimmie was hospitalized in Miami after an accident. The Guardianship
Program for Dade County, Florida, was appointed as Jimmie’s guardian.185 On October 6,
1993, Teresa petitioned the Wisconsin Circuit Court to appoint her guardian of Jimmie's
person and estate. Sauk County gave notice that it would move to dismiss Teresa's petitions
for lack of venue in that Jimmie was not a resident of or physically present in Sauk County,
Wisconsin. However, before the hearing was held Teresa transported Jimmie to Wisconsin.
On October 20, 1993, the Wisconsin circuit court directed Teresa to transport Jimmie
back to Florida. It dismissed Teresa's petitions after finding that Jimmie was not a resident
of Wisconsin, and held that the Wisconsin circuit court was required give full faith and credit
to the factual findings of the Florida court. The next day, Teresa moved the Wisconsin
circuit court to grant her petition for guardianship on the alternative statutory ground that
Jimmie was in Wisconsin under extraordinary circumstances requiring medical aid or the
prevention of harm to his person.186
The Wisconsin court found that Teresa was legally capable of discharging her duties
as established by the court in Florida. The court held that the Wisconsin circuit court erred
in its application of the full faith and credit clause when it treated as binding the Florida
court's finding that Jimmie resided in Miami. The court found that the error was one of law
and resulted in the erroneous exercise of the Wisconsin circuit court's discretion. The
Wisconsin appellate court found that the trial court was not required to extend full faith and
187Consider also In re Kassler, 19 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1940). New York does not require recognition
of the foreign guardianship under full faith and credit, in that foreign guardians can not assert
authority outside of the jurisdiction governing the appointment of the foreign state. Note, that in
New York, the guardian may apply for authority through an ancillary proceeding to act as a
guardian within the State of New York pursuant to a foreign decree or order.
188State ex re.l Kern v. Kern, 116 N.W.2d 337, 340 (Wis. 1962). See also, In re Erhardt, 27
A.D.2d 836, (N.Y.App. Div. 1967) (children were in the custody of both the paternal
grandparents and the paternal aunt. The New York court found that the paternal grandmother
maintained lawful custody of the children under New York law and that while the paternal aunt
argued that the Federal Constitution required that full faith and credit be given to a Florida
custody and guardianship order, the New York court found that at the time of the entry of the
Florida order, that the children's aunt did not have lawful custody and that she had not been
appointed their guardian by the New York court. Hence, the trial court held that the Constitution
did not require the extension of full faith and credit to either the Florida guardianship or custody
order since the aunt was not in legal custody of the children when the Florida court entered the
order); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees: Law and Reason v.
the Restatment, 51 MICH.L.REV. 345, 346 (1953); Morgan v. Potter, 157 U.S. 195 (1895 );
Bachman v. Mejias, 136 N.E.2d 866 (N.Y, 1956); New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S.
610 (1947).
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credit to the Florida order since a "judgment has no constitutional claim to a more conclusive
effect in the state of the forum than it has in the state where rendered." Hence, the Wisconsin
court was not required to give the Florida order full faith and credit without scrutiny from
the forum court. Under scrutiny, the Wisconsin court found that "the State of the forum has
at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it, or to depart from it as does
the State where it was rendered."187
Since a Florida court could modify an order appointing a guardian (in that the
guardian may resign or be removed), the Wisconsin court did not have to honor the Florida
guardianship order with full faith and credit in this situation. Consequently, the court held
that the state may ignore the residency findings in the Florida order without offending the
full faith and credit clause.188
By limiting the deference given to foreign judgments, arguably, if felons could serve
as guardians in Indiana, the Ohio court may not be required to give the foreign decree carte
189Guardianship of Enos, 670 N.E.2d 967 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (the Massachusetts court
enforced a Florida guardianship order after daughter removed her 90 year old incapacitated
mother to Massachusetts in violation of the Florida decree. The court acknowledged that some
states have declined to give full faith and credit to guardianship decisions issued by other states,
but noted that "Massachusetts courts have declined to give another jurisdiction's valid
guardianship order full faith and credit only when the best interest of the ward required
otherwise). Woodworth v. Spring, 4 Allen 321, 325 (Mass. 1862) (Hence, the Massachusetts
court declined to grant habeas corpus writ to the daughter, which allowed Florida to continue
with enforcing criminal charges against the daughter in Florida, when the guardian failed to
proffer a reason not to accord the Florida orders full faith and credit. The court considered the
ward’s best interest, and despite the fact that Florida had both personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, that it was the more convenient forum, that all of the potential witnesses resided in
Florida, and that the guardian had submitted herself to that jurisdiction, the paramount
consideration was the well-being of the ward, and whether travel would be an unacceptable risk
to her).
190Hilkmann v. Hilkmann, 858 A.2d 58,60 (Pa. 2003).
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blanc deference in the guardian’s appointment. On the other hand, could the felon-guardian
arguably serve in Ohio, even if Ohio otherwise objected to felons serving as guardians since
it would be more “preclusive” than the Indiana eligibility requirements for the appointment
of a guardian? The question that still remains is, "how much deference must a forum state
give to a foreign jurisdiction's orders and decrees?
c. Comity
As noted in the Replogle case, not all jurisdictions provide full faith and credit
automatically without a level of review in the forum jurisdiction. If the court limits full faith
and credit, or if full faith and credit is not applicable, will the forum court give deference to
the foreign jurisdiction's orders under principles of comity? The decision of whether to
extend comity may be discretionary, with the ward’s “best interest,” being considered.189
In the Hilkmann v. Hilkmann case, the court explored the concept of “comity” in
deciding whether to extend deference to a foreign court’s guardianship order.190 On July 14,




the guardian of her son, Daniel. The mother attached a medical opinion by the son’s
pediatrician to the guardianship petition that gave an opinion of Daniel's mental incapacity.
On October 27, 1999, the Israeli family court temporarily appointed Ms. Hilkmann the
guardian for six months. The father, Dirk H. Hilkmann, received the mother's petition but
failed to immediately respond. The Israeli court, after noting Mr. Hilkmann’s failure to
respond, found Daniel incapacitated and recommended that Mrs. Hilkmann be appointed
Daniel's permanent legal guardian.191 Subsequently, Mr. Hilkmann responded on February 8,
2000, protesting the Israeli court's grant of permanent guardianship.
In July 2000, the Hilkmann children flew to the United States to see their father for a
previously scheduled visit. While Daniel’s sister returned to Israel, Daniel remained with his
father. In August, Mr. Hilkmann enrolled Daniel in a local community college program for
persons with special needs and on September 5, 2000, Mrs. Hilkmann registered the Israeli
guardianship order in a Pennsylvania court. Additionally, she filed a petition requesting that
Pennsylvania enforce the Israeli guardianship order by forcing Daniel to return with her to
Israel.
The Pennsylvania appellate court considered whether the trial court satisfied due
process rights by enforcing the Israeli foreign guardianship order without making an
independent evaluation of the subject of the order or receiving evidence to support the Israeli
order. The Pennsylvania court found the full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution was inapplicable to a foreign country's decree.192 Despite not apply full faith
and credit, the Pennsylvania court considered whether the principle of comity supported its





authority) to give deference to the Israeli order. The court noted that the Israeli order was
not tainted by fraud, that it would not outrage the court's sense of justice, and it was not
obtained for the purpose of contravening the state’s laws or public policy, when it considered
its enforcement.193
Mr. Hilkmann disputed that the Israeli court correctly found his son to be
"incompetent." He argued that the Israeli court's reliance upon the common law principle of
mental competency was limited to that local jurisdiction, and should not to be extended by
full faith and credit. Mrs. Hilkmann, on the other hand, argued that the court should give
deference to the Israeli order under the principle of comity.194
The court considered that comity had been extended to non-guardianship matters
when domesticating foreign money judgments, enforcing sentences imposed by other
sovereigns, and accepting foreign adoptions. Nonetheless, the appellate court found that the
trial court abused its discretion when it violated Pennsylvania’s public policy and the court’s
sense of justice in this case. The Pennsylvania court was concerned that the trial court's
“decision would establish a precedent whereby any foreign citizen could enforce any
guardianship decree and commensurate finding of incompetency, regardless of the manner in
which it was issued.”195 The Pennsylvania court did not extend carte blanc deference under
principles of comity, but it looked behind the foreign judgment and exercised its "sideline
quarter-backing" and discretion. The Pennsylvania court was concerned that the Israeli court
failed to hear sufficient evidence of Daniel’s competency and that Daniel's interests were not
196State v. Nath, 52 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2002).
197Kulekowskis v. DiLeonardi, 941 F.Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
198Id.
199Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 743.
200Id. at 743-44.
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represented at the Israeli proceeding by a guardian ad litem. Therefore, deference was not
given under principles of comity.
Had the circumstances been different in the foreign jurisdiction, would a sister state
enforce the foreign order under principles of comity? Arguably, the courts may extend
comity; however, generally the courts more closely scrutinize a foreign order under
principles of comity than they might under full faith and credit.196
Likewise, in the case of Kulekowskis v. DiLeonardi,197 the court found that there was
an element of discretion when determining whether to grant comity to a foreign judgment.
Anthony DeSilva and Tammy Lynn Wright ("Tammy") were married in October 1986, and
bought a home together in Winnipeg, Canada.198 In December 1987, DeSilva and Tammy
were involved in a serious automobile accident in Illinois, and although Tammy survived,
she was left a quadriplegic with permanent and extensive brain damage. On March 24, 1988,
despite Tammy’s parent’s (Mr. and Mrs. Wright) objections, the Illinois court appointed Mr.
DeSilva as sole guardian of his wife's estate and person with no restrictions.199
In July 1989, Mr. DeSilva transferred Tammy back to their home in Winnipeg,
Canada so she could receive the socialized health care services for which she was eligible.200
After the move, and without Mrs. Wright’s approval, Mr. DeSilva took Tammy to Chicago
for further testing. After Mrs. Wright's failed attempt to keep Tammy in the United States,
201Id. at 744.
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her attorney represented to the Winnipeg Police Department that Tammy's husband had
kidnaped Tammy from her home in Winnipeg. The attorney did not inform the Winnipeg
Police Department of Mr. DeSilva's legal guardianship over Tammy. The Winnipeg Police
Department arranged for Mr. DeSilva and his companions to be stopped at the border by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Ontario Provincial Police, on Mr. DeSilva’s way
back to the United States.
The Canadian police stopped Mr. DeSilva and his companions at the border and
charged Mr. DeSilva with kidnaping. At Canada's request, the United States Attorney sought
the extradition of Mr. DeSilva and the other participants. Faced with imminent removal to
Canada, Mr. DeSilva brought before the Illinois court a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief
from the outstanding extradition order.201 In support of their habeas petition, Mr. DeSilva
and the other participants claimed among other things, that the dual criminality element
mandated by the Treaty of Extradition between the United States and Canada (the "Treaty")
was lacking.
The Illinois court granted Mr. DeSilva’s habeas relief since the dual criminality
requirement of the Treaty had not been complied with. The court reasoned that it would be
necessary to examine Mr. DeSilva’s conduct under the reverse fact scenario required by the
dual criminality element of the United States - Canada extradition treaty. If the facts were
reversed, the court found that Illinois would be unable to successfully prosecute Mr. DeSilva
for kidnaping because it would not require DeSilva to register his Canadian guardianship in
Illinois. Because Illinois would recognize a valid Canadian guardianship under principles of
comity, a Canadian guardian, like an Illinois guardian, would not be capable of kidnaping his
ward from Illinois. Thus, since the guardians' conduct would not be criminal in Illinois, the
202Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 744.
203Id. at 744-45.
204Id.
205Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 747.
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dual criminality requirement of the Treaty was not satisfied.202
In reaching its ruling, the court confirmed that recognizing a foreign decree under
comity is more relaxed and subject to closer judicial scrutiny than under full faith and credit.
The court stated, “[i]t is not a rule of law, [and] more than mere courtesy and
accommodation, [but it] does not achieve the force of an imperative or obligation.” Comity
is extended by the United State’s courts as an “expression of understanding [with regard] to
international duty and convenience and the rights of persons protected by its own laws [as
opposed to those of other nations]. “203 The court found that in order to extend comity, that
the moving party must establish a prima facie case that the judgment was entitled to
recognition.
The Illinois court required four criteria for the recognition of a foreign judgment: (1)
that the rendering court had jurisdiction over the person and subject matter; (2) that there was
timely notice and an opportunity to present the defense; (3) that there was no fraud involved;
and (4) that the proceedings were according to a civilized jurisprudence.204 The court held
that giving the tribunal discretion, that such an interpretation of comity was “fallacious
insofar as it casts the decision of whether to accord recognition to a foreign judgment in an
arbitrary and whimsical light.”205 Comity, the court found, required not an arbitrary decision,
but a decision based on the recognition that the court’s authority is conditioned on the
206Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 166-68 (1895) (establishing the original four-part federal
comity test).
207Kulekowskis, 941 F.Supp. at 748. Guardianship decisions have occasionally been denied full
faith and credit in some jurisdictions, e.g., Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 749-751 (Md. 1993)
(and cases cited therein). Massachusetts courts give a foreign jurisdiction's guardianship orders
full faith and credit only when it would be in the best interest of the ward. Woodworth v. Spring,
4 Allen 321, 325 (Mass. 1862).
208Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613 (1880) (quoting Justice Story, "The rights and powers of
guardians are considered as strictly local; and not as entitling them to exercise any authority over
the person or personal property of their wards in other states, upon the same general reasoning
and policy which have circumscribed the rights and authorities of executors and
administrators."); Barnett v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 34 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1929)
(upholding Hoyt v. Sprague); Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 749-51 (Md. 1993) (holding that
full faith and credit does not apply to foreign guardianship orders).
209See infra Appendix C.
210Holliday, Kimpflen, and Necheles, 42A Tex. Jur. 3d Guardianship and Conservatorship §§
483, Receipt and Acceptance of Foreign Guardianship (2006).
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application of the four-part test.206 In this case, the court found that under the federal test for
comity, that the guardian met the necessary threshold criteria to invoke the doctrine of
comity.207
If full faith and credit is recognized, how much comity or credit should or must be
given?208 Arguably, under full faith and credit, and furthermore, under principles of comity,
the court may conditionally accept the foreign order and make inquiries and modifications.209
3. Best Interest/Judicial Discretion:
Rather than extend comity or full faith and credit, may a court provide deference to a
foreign decree based on a balancing test performed under judicial discretion, rather than
pursuant to a statute or a constitution? For example, Texas requires that the courts of that
jurisdiction grant applications to accept foreign guardianships if the transfer of the
guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interest of the ward.210 Under
211Robert H. Weber, Estate Planning for the Aging or Incapacitated Client in Massachusetts:
Protecting Legal Rights, Preserving Resources, and Providing Health Care Options, Sections 3.6
and 3.7, Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc., Substitute Personal Decision-Making
(2005).
212Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 351,
366 (1999).
213 Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 US 602 (1935).
214 Fla .Stat. Ann. Const. Art. 2, § 3; Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), reh'g denied, (Oct.
21, 2004) and related reference, 2004 WL 2726107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2004) and petition
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judicial discretion, will the state court be able to take this approach when considering
whether a felon may be appointed as a guardian in the forum jurisdiction?
In the jurisdictions that allow judicial discretion in extending full faith and credit, the
court may consider the ward’s best interest, which would allow the court the ability to
redetermine the ward's capacity and the rights, powers, and duties of the guardian.211 This
policy could be argued to allow the foreign jurisdiction’s guardianship appointment,
regardless of whether the Texas court would have appointed the guardian under its laws.212 It
may be read to restrain the Texas court from giving deference if the court may “go behind
the foreign jurisdiction’s appointment” and set its own eligibility standards. Under either
argument, the matter has not been decided and therefore, creates ambiguity.
B. Preservation of Checks and Balances
Borne from the United States Constitution, the doctrines of “separation of powers”
and “checks and balances” were designed to separate the branches of government and ensure
each branch is free from the control and coercion of the others.213 Accordingly, these
doctrines encompass two fundamental prohibitions: (1) no branch may encroach upon the
powers of another, and (2) no branch may delegate to another its constitutionally assigned
power.214 Precisely at issue is whether the first fundamental prohibition delineated by the
for cert. filed (U.S. Dec. 1, 2004).
215Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
216 State v. Curtin, 764 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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Constitution is violated where statutes enacted by the legislature deprive the court of its
discretionary powers to make case-by-case decisions for the ward’s best interest.
Although Article III of the Constitution is silent on the judiciary’s power, the
Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison established the judiciary’s fundamental power of
judicial review.215 Judicial review is the judiciary’s separate and independent power, and
serves as the judiciary’s checks and balances on the other two branches of government.
While the Constitution is clear that no branch may encroach upon the power of another, the
separation of powers has continuously been challenged by statutes attempting to remove the
court’s discretionary powers. For example, in State v. Curtin, a Florida court found the
Sexual Predator Act violated the separation of powers doctrine because it eliminated the
court’s discretionary function.216
Four states’ guardianship statutes, as well as the majority of uniform models and
standards, explicitly prohibit the appointment of felons as guardians, which effectively
removes the judiciary’s decision making ability concerning felons’ guardianship eligibility.
Although it has resulted in injustices, many courts have been unable to redress the situation
simply because of the construction of their states' guardianship statutes. For instance, the
court in The Matter of the Petition of Frances Lagrange held, “[i]n the face of this absolute
disqualification by statutory enactment, the court possesses no discretion whatsoever. . . The
remedy is, however, a legislative and not a judicial function, and until it has been supplied,
the courts at times [become] the unwitting instruments of hardship and even downright
217In re Lagrange, 274 N.Y.S. 702 (N.Y. Surr. 1934).
218The fundamental role of the judiciary as articulated in Marbury v. Madison “. . . is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177, (1803). See also, King v. Finch, 428 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970);
Bandy v. Mickelson, 44 N.W.2d 341 (S.D. 1950); In re Mann, 154 S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1967).
Under the separation of powers provision of the Massachusetts Constitution, the legislature may
modify, enlarge, diminish, or abolish the jurisdiction of all courts subordinate to the Supreme
Judicial Court but, having established statutory courts, the legislature has no authority to
abrogate the inherent powers of the courts or to render them inoperative. Gray v. Comm’r of
Revenue, 665 N.E.2d 17 (Mass. 1996).
219The constitution of the State of Florida provides that the powers of the government of the state
are divided into three branches--legislative, executive, and judicial--and prohibits any person
properly belonging to one of the departments from exercising any powers appertaining to either
of the others except as expressly provided for in the constitution. Dade County Classroom
Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Legislature, 269 So.2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1972).
220State v. Curtin, 764 So.2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
221Reyes v. State, 854 So.2d 816 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Reyes also argued that the Act
violated the separation of powers clause of Article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution
because it made the sexual predator designation mandatory for all defendants who meet the
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injustice.”217 Rather than infringing on or effectively eliminating the judiciary’s
discretionary power by an outright prohibition against certain individuals serving as
guardians, the legislature should create statutes that allow for judicial discretionary
interpretation and the consideration of the ward’s best interest in determining the eligibility
of the guardian.
When the legislature removes the court discretion to determine whether a felon may
be an eligible guardian, the balance of powers established as early as Marbury v. Madison218
are again challenged and the judiciary’s “checks and balances” are again eroded. The
separation of the powers of government encompasses both the state and federal
constitutions.219 Arguably, when a statute removes judiciary discretion, the statute violates
the separation of powers between the branches of the government.220
Compare however, in the case of Reyes v. State,221 the Florida Fourth District Court
statutory criteria, thus, removing from the trial court any discretion in making this determination.
In Kelly v. State, 795 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001), the Fifth District rejected
this argument as did the Second District in Milks v. State , 848 So.2d 1167, 1169. Cf. State v.
Cotton, 769 So.2d 345 (Fla. 2000)(holding that Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act,
although removing all discretion from trial court and transferring to state attorney, did not
violate separation of powers clause).
222FLA. STAT. .ANN. Const. Art. 2, § 3 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(4)(a)1, (5)(a)1
(West 2006).
223 State v. Curtin, 764 So.2d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
224Id.
225Whatley v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On November 27, 2002,
appellants filed a motion asserting that they were entitled to recover their entire fees despite the
statutory cap because if the court construed § 140 to apply indefinitely, the application would be
an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Appellants claimed that § 140 raised
separation of powers concerns, because it effectively removed from the courts’ discretion to
award reasonable attorneys' fees under IDEA, that Congress encroached on the judiciary's
exclusive domain.
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of Appeal held that the Sexual Predator Act, which effectively removed any discretion from
the trial court, did not violate separation of powers clause of the Florida state constitution,
even though it made the designation of offenders as sexual predators mandatory for all
offenders who met the statutory criteria.222 But not all Florida courts agreed. In State v.
Curtin,223 Florida’s First District Court of Appeals held that the Sexual Predator Act, which
required the sentencing court to impose sexual predator designation on a defendant that met
the statutory criteria, violated the separation of powers because it removed court
discretion.224 The court noted that by removing the court's discretion, the Sexual Predator
Act appeared to violate the separation of powers clause.225
Recognizing the limitations imposed on the judiciary by restraining its case-by-case
decision making, the policy makers may consider further the removal of court discretion,
especially in this area where the demand for eligible guardians may outstrip the supply of
226In October 2003, the Florida Legislature passed a law that gave Gov. Jeb Bush the authority to
order that Terri Schiavo's feeding tube be reinserted. However, in the fall of 2004, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that this law was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers
because it permitted the executive branch to "interfere with the final judicial determination in a
case." Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) The court also held that the law constituted
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the governor, in that it gave the governor
"unbridled discretion" to make a decision about a citizen's constitutional rights
227Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J.
351, 352-53 (1999).
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available guardians.226 If the legislatures adopt a “best interest of the ward test,” even though
it may be more subjective and not as judicially efficient, the significant role of judicial
interpretation is preserved, and the ward’s best interest preserves the balance that is required
for a rational basis.
C. Considerations of Policy-Makers
Two growing demographic trends, the increasing age of society and the increase in
numbers of felony convictions,227 are currently on a collision course. Although the
increasing number of felony convictions will disqualify only a small percentage of the pool
of potential guardians, it will do so at a time when more guardians will be needed. It is easy
to conceive of situations where a loving and otherwise qualified spouse or child will be
disqualified from serving as a guardian due to a past indiscretion. Policy-makers may wish
to re-think the policies that absolutely exclude persons with past felony convictions before it
becomes more common for wards to be denied assistance.
Other uniform statutes balance the interests of affected categories of individual rights
versus the states' interests. The legislatures may wish to borrow from other statutes with
similar interstate concerns, i.e., the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, or the prototype
Uniform Adult Guardianship Jurisdiction Act. For example, Maryland’s proposed Section
228For example, see Mack v. Mack, 618 A.2d 744, 746 (Md. 1993). The Circuit Court for
Baltimore County held that the appointment of a guardian by the Florida court was not entitled
to full faith and credit. (footnotes omitted). It appointed a temporary guardian and reserved
judgment on the guardianship issue until a later hearing. The Florida guardian argued in her
pretrial memoranda that the circuit court "should order withdrawal of Ronald's feeding tube."
After a full hearing on this issue, the circuit court determined that "absent either a living will or a
power of attorney for health care, the decision to withhold sustenance should be based on what
intent Ronald had, or would have, as determined under a clear and convincing standard of
proof." The court found insufficient evidence that Ronald would have desired to terminate his
life support systems rather than exist in a permanent vegetative state. See also, William S.
Heyman, Survey, Development in Maryland Law, 1992-93, 53 MD. L. REV. 908 (1994).
229Sally Balch Hurme, Current Trends in Guardianship Reform, 7 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues
143, n. 186 (Fall 1995-1996).
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13-105(b)(3)228 provides for full faith and credit of foreign guardianship orders if the foreign
orders were issued in compliance with that state's guardianship procedures.229 How does the
court determine if the foreign order was entered in compliance with its own procedures
without an independent review of the foreign state's guardianship procedures? Perhaps the
forum state would give deference to the foreign state’s order absent a challenged by an
interested party.
Adopting the notice procedures found in other uniform acts, as in the prototype
Uniform Adult Guardianship Jurisdiction Act, which provides that “[a]ll decrees rendered by
a state . . . would be binding against all parties who received notice of the proceeding, and
would be conclusive as to all issues of fact or law . . . .” If every interested party received
notice in the forum state, and there were concerns about the eligibility of the proposed
guardian, the forum state’s courts would be able to consider the ward’s best interest, and at
the same time, provide due process notice to all concerned. Who should receive notice,
however? Who is entitled to standing?
1. Rational Basis Challenges
When the policy makers determine that felons are excluded from serving as guardians
230Donald T. Kramer, Equal Protection of the Laws; Generally; Rule Permitting Classification,
16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 808 (2006).
231 Donald T. Kramer, Equal Protection of the Laws; Rational Basis Test, 16B AM JUR 2D
Constitutional Law § 813 (2006).
232FLA. STAT. ANN. § 744.309 (West 2006).
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carte blanc, thus depriving the courts from making case-by-case decisions, many wards may
be underserved. Does the state’s interest in protecting the potentially vulnerable ward
outweigh the ward’s right to have a guardian appointed that will serve the ward’s best
interest, despite the proposed guardian’s past criminal record?
Under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution, in order for the
government to impose different standards between classes of persons, i.e., felons versus non-
felons, it must have a rational basis for making such a distinguishment.230
In order to challenge a state statute under the rational basis test, the challenger is first
required to identify the purpose for which the statute was designed. After identifying the
intended purpose of the statute, the more difficult challenge under rational basis is that the
challenger must show that there is no rational basis for which the legislative body could have
concluded that the statute would have served its intended purpose.231 When dealing with
vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and the developmentally disabled, the possibility of a
statute prohibiting "felons" from serving as guardians being found to violate the
Constitution's rational basis test is difficult, if not impossible.
Statutes such as Florida Statute § 744.309, however, may actually prevent needy
wards from finding anyone eligible to serve as their guardian, especially when there is no
estate funds.232 Granted, felons are not the most empathetic classification to curry favor, yet
the statutes that preclude felons from serving as guardians more dramatically affect the
incapacitated and indigent that require a guardian. As a class, developmentally incapacitated
233Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act of 1997 § 309 (a)(4) (West 2005).
234U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER,
SEX AND RACE: 1950-PRESENT 1 (2006), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/ms1.pdf.
235 WAN HE ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 65+IN THE UNITED
STATES:2005 2 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf
236“To this end, guardianship and conservatorship for disabled persons shall be utilized only as is
necessary to promote their well-being, including protection from neglect, exploitation, and
abuse; shall be designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and
independence in each person; and shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by each
person’s actual mental and adaptive limitations.” KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 387.500(3) (West
2005).
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persons who are in need of a guardian are not only innocent victims, but also are
detrimentally affected by a statute that has as its basis, the protection of said classes.
As discussed, an incapacitated person who is widowed may not under some states'
restraining-type statutes, have the benefit of a spouse to serve as a guardian. A long-time
spouse is not only a natural candidate to serve as a guardian but is also given substantial
legislative priority with respect to the hierarchy of potential appointees.233 Yet, the
prohibitionary statutes are too broad when they prevent an indigent person, in need of a
guardian, from appointing a spouse or the ward's son or daughter.
Similarly, divorcees also do not have the benefit of a spouse to assume a guardianship
role in the event of incapacity, and may be limited to an adult son, daughter or sibling. The
number of divorce filings has risen dramatically since 1950.234 Furthermore there is a
significant elder population living without spouses, either due to divorce, death, or lifestyle
choices.235
Under guardianship statutes, one governmental interest is to protect the ward from
exploitation and abuse.236 Presumably, the legislature considered felons as "presumptively"
237Chang v. Glynn County Sch. Dist., No. CV206-099, 2006 LEXIS 57095, 7-8 (S.D. Ga. Aug.
15, 2006).
238Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099 (3d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 435, 139 L. Ed. 2d 334 (U.S. 1997); Scariano v. Justices of Supreme Court of
State of Ind., 38 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 1994), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 47 F.3d
173 (7th Cir. 1995) and cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1144, 115 S. Ct. 2582, 132 L. Ed. 2d 831 (1995).
239The ward is not stripped of protection by allowing felons to serve as guardians. Wards may be
protected by other statutes too. For example, Michael G. Walsh, Homicide as Precluding Taking
Under Will or by Intestacy, 25 A.L.R.4TH 787 (1983); Hatcher v Aetna Life Ins. Co., 105 F
Supp. 808 (D. Or. 1952); In re Estate of Klein, 378 A2d 1182 (Pa. 1977).
240Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973), cited in Chang v. Glynn County Sch. Dist.,
No. CV206-099, 2006 LEXIS 57095, 7-8 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2006).
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prone to exploit or abuse the vulnerable group of incapacitated wards, and therefore, made
felons ineligible to serve as guardians, regardless of the nature of the felon, the age of the
felon, the relationship between the felon and the ward, and the circumstances. Such a
blanket prohibition may be both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.237
The rational basis standard of review does not require the basis to be the least
restrictive means of achieving the permissible end so long as the state can rationally further
its goal."238 Yet, the absolute prohibition against felons serving as guardians violates the
"over-inclusive test."239 Not all felons are prone to be exploitative or abusive. Consider the
adults existing with marginal capacity who have been taken care of by parents before
reaching the age of majority. In such cases, the parents have taken care of the children,
especially in cases where both the children and the parents are indigent. With indigency,
where it is difficult for the ward to find a guardian to serve, the prohibition against felons
serving as the guardian regardless of the relationship between the ward and the guardian, and
the ward’s lack of an estate, the basis for the rule is over-inclusive and may fail the rational
basis test.240
241Miriam R. Kennedy, Considerations in Planning for Incapacity, 32115 NBI-CLE 232, 233
(2006).
242Commission on National Probate Court Standards, National Probate Court Standards 1
(1993). The National Probate Court Standards are reprinted with the consent of the National
Center for State Courts, Interstate Guardianship Project Staff, Paula L. Hannaford, Esq., Project
Director, 300 Newport Avenue (23185), P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798
[Telephone no. (757) 253-2000; FAX no. (757) 220-0449].
243Legal Encyclopedia, Uniform Probate Code, http://www.answers.com/topic/uniform-
probate-code (last visited Aug 18, 2006).
244Amy Kosanovich & Michael J. Chmiel, One Family in Two Courts: Coordination for
Families in Illinois Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 588 -
89 (Spring 2006).
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The absolute prohibition may also be under-inclusive to protect vulnerable wards
from exploitation and abuse. Many elderly indigent wards fall victim to abuse and
exploitation. The blanket prohibition of felons from serving as guardians does not protect
the vulnerability of the indigent elderly or the "new adult" indigent, and is therefore under-
inclusive to accomplish the legislature's goals.241
2. Should Adoption of Uniform Models and Standards be Mandatory?
Because reducing the effect of a felony conviction via annulment, expunction, or
pardon is not overly effective, another viable solution is the states’ mandatory adoption of a
uniform standard, statute, or code. Federal legislators and independent organizations have
drafted numerous uniform standards and models, including the Uniform Probate Code, the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act, and the National Probate Court
Standards,242 to help aid the states in adopting more cohesive guardianship statutes.243 These
unified standards are designed to improve interstate cooperation to “avoid jurisdictional
competition and conflict between states, [in order] to protect the [ward’s] best interest, and to
discourage forum shopping.”244
245The NCCUSL was formed in 1892, and since that time has drafted over 200 uniform laws. It
is a non-profit unincorporated association, comprised of state commissions on uniform laws
from each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. There are over 300 commissioners that are appointed by each state. Each state
determines the number of commissioners and the method of their appointment, and most states
provide for such measures by statute. Conference members must be lawyers, qualified to
practice law. Most commissioners are practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff
and law professors.
246Uniform Law Commissioners, www.nccusl.org (follow About NCCUSL; then follow
Introduction to the Organization).
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As will be discussed in greater detail hereafter, the Uniform Probate Code does not
mention felony and the disqualification to act as a felon. The National Guardianship
Standard explicitly prohibits felons from being guardians absolutely. Hence, should a
uniform system move towards a "best interest" model for the ward with the requirement of
disclosure of the prior felony? If disclosed, the court may then consider the felony as one
element of determining the eligibility of the proposed guardian. In a case-by-case analysis,
the court may exercise the best interest of the ward.
a. Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Placement Act
The Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”) was proposed by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”)245 in 1969. The UPC was the product
of a collaborative effort of the NCCUSL and the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of the American Bar Association. In 1991 the UPC was replaced by a revised
version, which was derived from a study of the UPC conducted by the Joint Editorial Board
for the Uniform Probate Code, an organization representing the NCCUSL, the ABA, and the
American College of Trust and Estate Lawyers.246
The UPC commissioners formed the national conference to discuss, draft and propose
laws, codes, guidelines, and recommendations to the states that should be uniform and
247Id.
248Id. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws (NCCUSL) has also
provided a framework for transferring the jurisdiction of guardians. See Section 107 of the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Placement Act (1997) (UGPPA). Under the UGPPA, a
foreign guardian may petition for appointment in the new state if venue is or will be
established. To date, the UGPPA has been adopted by Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii,
Minnesota, and Montana. We note that NCCUSL is beginning the process of considering
whether a revision to the UGPPA or a stand-alone jurisdictional provision should be
proposed. See Sally Balch Hurme, Mobile Guardianships: Finding Solutions to Interstate
Jurisdiction Problems, J. Nat’l College Prob. Judges 12 (Fall 2004). See also Uniform Law
Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (follow About NCCUSL; then follow
Constitution and Procedures); In re Guardianship of Jane E.P., 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis.
2005).
249 Uniform Law Commissioners, http://www.nccusl.org. In 1997 revisions to the UGPPA
were proposed after a two year study by the ABA Senior Lawyers Division Task Force on
Guardianship Reform. The Task Force consisted of representatives of the ABA Senior
Lawyers Division, the ABA Real Property Probate and Trust Law Section, and the
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and Mental and Physical Disability Law.
Other groups interested in guardianship, such as AARP and the National Senior Citizens Law
Center also contributed heavily to the study.
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consistent in the treatment of said laws.247 Each proposed act is investigated, and a report is
prepared for the Executive Committee as to whether the area of law is one where uniformity
is desirable. Once the Executive Committee approves a recommendation a drafting
committee is appointed, and proposed laws that are drafted are submitted for initial debate at
the National Conference’s annual meeting. Once the draft is approved, it may be officially
adopted as either a uniform or model act. Once receiving approval by the requisite number
of states it is then officially promulgated for consideration by the states. 248
The Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act ("UGPPA") was
developed from implementation of the UPC by several states. While the UGPPA can be
considered either a separate act or a subpart of the UPC,249 it is derived from Article 5 of the
UPC and addresses guardianships and conservatorships. Not every state has adopted the
250Law by Source: Uniform Laws, Uniform Probate Code Locator (2003)
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html. (Eighteen out of fifty states).
251Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974) (holding that “where there is no clear
intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one,
regardless of the priority of enactment”).
252Principles of statutory construction suggest that the standard prescribed in later-enacted
legislation should control. The legislature is presumed to know the existing law. State ex rel.
Tomasic v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County/Kansas, 955 P.2d 1136, 1152 (Kan.
1998). If two statutes addressing the same subject are inconsistent, the later in time prevails to
the extent of any inconsistency. Id., See also, Public Employees Retirement Ass'n v. Greene, 580
P.2d 385 (Colo. 1978). In addition, a specific statute controls over general legislation. Id., See
also, Motor Vehicle Division v. Dayhoff, 609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
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UPC or the UGPPA.250
Both the UPC and the UGPPA are silent on the issue of whether felons may serve as
guardians. The UPC and UGPPA’s treatment of the issue of felons’ guardianship eligibility
is not sufficient to maintain uniformity among the states with respect to the issue. Even if
such uniform acts were adopted by every state, uniformity could not be achieved under
principles of statutory construction. For example, Florida’s statute § 744.309 expressly
makes felons ineligible to serve as guardians. If Florida adopted the UPC or UGPPA, which
are both silent on the issue of felons’ eligibility to serve as guardians, statutory construction
that requires specific statutes to take precedence over broadly worded statutes, would
undercut the uniformity created by nation-wide adoption of such uniform acts.251
Also, although later adopted statutes generally prevail over formerly adopted statutes,
a former statute will prevail where it is more specific than the latter.252 Florida Statute
§ 744.309 is more specific with respect to felons eligibility than is the UPC or UGPPA, both
of which are silent on the issue. States enacting statutes similar to Florida Statute § 744.309
will undermine the uniformity sought in enacting the UPC or UGPPA, as the more specific
statutes will prevail in statutory construction over the UPC and UGPPA with respect to the
253Id.




257This does not consider principles of comity and full faith and credit.
258Commission on National Probate Court Standards and Advisory Committee on Interstate





Guardianships are largely creatures of state statutes.254 Each state possesses its own
rules for the creation, regulation, reporting and accounting of the guardianship estate and the
ward. For example, Minnesota may provide a guardianship order that is effective in the State
of Minnesota, but what happens if the ward relocates to Florida? Many wards have
connections to relatives, assets and property in more than one state. The ward may find the
availability of different health care resources or caregiving services by relocating to a
different forum. Also, the caregivers may relocate for personal reasons and wish to move the
ward with them.
When the ward relocates, the responsibility for the transition falls upon state courts.255
The new forum will be responsible for monitoring and enforcing guardianship orders that
may have been issued outside of their jurisdiction.256 How much deference should the new
forum provide to the foreign venue’s orders and decrees? In most cases, excepting
guardianship of minor cases, “to which interstate compacts or agreements may be applicable,
no agreements to cooperate in the handling of interstate guardianships currently exist.”257
b. National Probate Court Standards: 258
259Symposium, Creating the "Portable" Guardianship: Legal and Practical Implications of
Probate Court Cooperation in Interstate Guardianship Cases, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 351,
366 (1999).
260Standard 3.3.11, National Probate Court Standards (1993).
261 http://www.probatect.org/ohioprobatecourts/pdf/national_probate_standards.pdf.
262O'Sullivan and Saah, National Probate Court Standards, The Maryland Institute for Continuing
Professional Education of Lawyers, Inc., The Practitioner's Guide to Adult Guardianship and
Guardianship Alternatives in Maryland, Section 3.3 (2001).
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The interstate or international relocation of the ward after the guardianship has been
established is not a new concept. The issue is how much credit should be given to foreign
judgments or decrees.259 The National Probate Court Standards ("NPCS") are additional
uniform standards that were designed to address, in part, the deficiencies inherent in the
modern guardianship system concerning interstate relocations of the ward.260
The NPCS were developed by a commission (“the commission”) comprised of
members of the National Court Probate Judges and the National Center for State Courts to
provide commonality and cooperation between the states in the guardianship system.261
The comments to the National Probate Court Standards ("the Standards") “require
probate courts to be accommodating and responsive to the wishes of the respondent as well
as convenient and accessible. A guardianship is not intended to restrict freedom
unreasonably or to limit the flexibility, choices, and convenience available to the ward.”262
How do the Standards protect the ward’s choices, and yet provide the judiciary with the
discretion it requires to act in the ward’s best interest, especially in light of the absolute
prohibition of certain persons from serving as guardians?
Although the Standards ideally would not unnecessarily limit the ward’s choices and
preferences, each state supports its own criteria of eligibility for the appointment of
263Standard 3.5.3 Transfer of Guardianship. The Commentary for this Standard
. . .is consistent with . . . the provisions of Standard 3.3.14, Reports by Guardian, . . . It is
based on the assumption that most guardians are acting in the interest of the ward and
that the notice and reporting requirements, and the opportunity to bring objections to the
transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the appropriateness of the
transfer of the guardianship. Generally, receiving courts should allow the guardianship to
be "imported," giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign
guardianship orders. However, enforcement and necessary administrative changes (e.g.,
periodic reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or court visitor, bond
requirements) of the guardianship may be made to bring the guardianship into
compliance with the requirements of the receiving jurisdiction (italics added). Ideally,
such changes should be made in accordance with the receiving court's monitoring and
review schedule and requirements. . . .
The commentary to this Standard fails to address whether the “full import” of the foreign
order should be consistent with the forum state’s eligibility requirements.
264Even under Standard 3.5.1 that requires that the different probate courts “communicate and
cooperate to resolve guardianship disputes and related matters,” said standards do not overcome
the obstacles propounded by state legislatures through statutes. The ideals of the Standards
would require the individual state legislatures to prepare accommodating and more consistently
uniform legislation.
265In re Estate of Roy v. Roy, 265 Ill.App.3d 99 (Ill.App. Ct. 3rd Dist. 1994).
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guardians that may conflict with the forum state’s requirements and the ward’s choice of
guardian.263 Should courts be free to adopt the Standards, regardless of their own legislative
restrains, to allow the appointment pursuant to full faith and credit, or under principles of
comity, in order to remove the barriers that impede the ward’s wishes?264 The commentary
to the Standards suggest that the guardian be familiar with the laws and requirements of the
forum jurisdiction, but offers little guidance as to what the guardian should do if the
eligibility requirements between the jurisdictions differ. Although the Standards do not
require a hearing on the transfer of the guardianship, a hearing is generally required by the
court or legislature, or is requested by the ward or interested persons named in the original
petition.265 If the court does not require a hearing and no interested party sets the
266John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1108 (March 1984). See also Barbara L. Hopkins, The Fruit of the Task Force
on Guardianship's Labors: Heightened Protection of Autonomy for Aged Persons and Persons
with Disabilities 7 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 81 (Fall/Winter 1995-1996).
267Standard 3.3.11, National Probate Court Standards (1993).
268 A specific statute controls over general legislation. Motor Vehicle Division v. Dayhoff,
609 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1980).
269 See note 23, FCSL Elder Law Clinic Matter.
270Supra at 268.
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domestication of the guardianship order for a hearing, then it is possible that an ineligible
person could act as a guardian, either to the benefit or to the detriment of the ward’s best
interests.266
When the Standards addressed deference to existing orders, the commission prepared
Standard 3.3.11, titled “Qualifications and Appointment of Guardians,” and its subsequent
commentary. The commission recommended that the Standards adopt the “best interest of
the ward” approach in the appointment of a guardian.267
While a sliding “best interest scale” preserves judicial discretion, the Standards are
insufficient as they remain silent on the issue of felons’ guardianship eligibility. The
adoption of a uniform standard must adequately address all issues, or risk being trumped by
the individual states’ statutes that may address the issue with more specificity.268 For
instance, depending on the state, the mother of the disabled child may still be disqualified
under the Standard’s best interest test since the uniform scheme does not specifically address
the issue and the specific state statute may exclude her as a prior felon.269 Arguably under
the construction of enforcing the more specific statute over the general statute, the uniform
Standards do not alleviate the jurisdictional issues inherent in the proposed scheme.270 If the
2713.5 Interstate Guardianships
Standard 3.5.1 Communication and Cooperation Between Courts
Standard 3.5.2 Screening and Review of Petition
Standard 3.5.3 Transfer of Guardianship
Standard 3.5.4 Receipt and Acceptance of a Transferred Guardianship
Standard 3.5.5 Initial Hearing in the Court Accepting the Transferred Guardianship
Filings Trusts, Wills, Estates, Guardianship, and Mental Health Cases, 1984- 1990
Trends in Guardianship Filings: This standard is consistent with and extends to interstate
guardianships the provisions of Standard 3.3.14, Reports by Guardian, and state requirements for
annual reports and accountings by the guardian. Its intent is to facilitate the transfer of a
guardianship to another state in cases in which the court is satisfied that the guardianship is valid
and that the guardian has performed his or her duties properly in the interests of the ward for the
duration of his or her appointment. It is based on the assumption that most guardians are acting
in the interest of the ward and that the notice and reporting requirements, and the opportunity to
bring objections to the transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the
appropriateness of the transfer of the guardianship.
Generally, receiving courts should allow the guardianship to be "imported," giving full faith and
credit to the terms and powers of foreign guardianship orders. However, enforcement and
necessary administrative changes (e.g., periodic reporting requirements, appointment of guardian
ad litem or court visitor, bond requirements) of the guardianship may be made to bring the
guardianship into compliance with the requirements of the receiving jurisdiction.
272Standard 3.5.3, National Probate Court Standards (1993).
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Standards addressed the specific issue of whether courts may consider appointing felons as
guardians, when combined with the best interest approach, the uniform standards would then
have the potential to resolve interstate guardianship issues on this point.
The Commission of NPCS addressed the deference that a forum jurisdiction may be
given to the foreign order. Should the state legislatures or courts consider adopting the
Standards of the NPCS Commission?271 If the Standards were adopted, would the Standards
resolve the issue of the eligibility of the guardian appointment in interstate situations?
The commentary to Standard 3.5.3 provides that the Standards are intended to extend
to interstate guardianships. For example, under Standard 3.5.3, certain provisions of the
guardianship procedures are intended to be universally consistent, i.e., report requirements
by a guardian, requirements for annual reports, and accountings by the guardian.272 The
273Supra at 271.
274In re Guardianship of Jane E.P. 283 Wis.2d 258, 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005). See also,
Standard 3.5.3, National Probate Court Standards (1993).
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drafters intended the Standards to facilitate the transfer of guardianships to another state in
cases in which the court is satisfied that the guardianship is valid and that the guardians have
performed their duties properly in the interests of the ward for the duration of their
appointment. The Standards are based on the presumption that most guardians are acting in
the interest of the ward, and that the notice, reporting requirements, and the opportunity to
bring objections to the transfer to the attention of the court, are sufficient checks on the
appropriateness of the transfer. Specifically, the Standards indicate that “notice” is important
because the drafters view the transfer of a guardianship as an “administrative procedure that
does not require a determination by the foreign court of the ward's incapacity or the
appropriateness of the guardian's appointment and assigned powers and responsibilities.”273
If the transfer of the guardianship is considered primarily administrative, should the
forum court that is considering using the Standards as a guide provide complete deference to
the foreign state’s guardianship order? If yes, should complete deference be extended
without the forum jurisdiction verifying the guardian’s qualifications and eligibility under the
forum state’s laws? Based on the discussions above, it is unlikely that the forum court
would provide such a level of deference.
The Commentary to the Standards indicates that the forum court should allow the
guardianship to be imported, “giving full faith and credit to the terms and powers of foreign
guardianship orders.”274 However, the Commentary is silent as to how much scrutiny the
forum court may give the existing order. Specifically, the Commentary states that
“enforcement and necessary administrative changes (e.g., bond requirements, periodic
275Id.
276In re Guardianship of Jane E.P. 283 Wis.2d 258, 700 N.W.2d 863 (Wis. 2005). “Cooperation
and communication, and a proper distribution of responsibilities among states, should facilitate
the movement of guardianships and should be such that the parties would see it in their interests
to comply with the requirements.” Id.
277Note that Standard 3.5.5 mandates that “no later than ninety (90) days after acceptance of a
transfer of guardianship, the probate court should conduct a review hearing of the guardianship
during which it may modify the administrative procedures or requirements of the guardianship in
accordance with local and state laws and procedures.” Again, such a review will not resolve an
inconsistency in guardian eligibility requirements. The Commentary to this Standard states that
“Unless specifically requested to do otherwise by the ward, the guardian, or an interested person
because of a change of circumstances, the court should give full faith and credit to the terms of
the existing guardianship concerning the rights, powers and responsibilities of the guardian.”
(Italics added).
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reporting requirements, appointment of guardian ad litem or court visitor) of the
guardianship may be made to bring the guardianship into compliance with the requirements
of the receiving jurisdiction.”275 Does that mean that the forum court should scrutinize the
guardian under the forum’s state’s eligibility requirements? If yes, does that also preclude an
existing guardian from continuing to serve in a jurisdiction like Florida, when the existing
guardian has a prior felony, regardless of the reason for the felony conviction? To what
extent will the forum court be able to scrutinize, even under the adoption of the Standards?276
Under Standard 3.5.4, the forum court “should recognize the appointment and powers
of the guardian and accept the guardianship under the terms as specified in the transferred
guardianship order.” Again, the Standards have not addressed what the guardian is required
to do, or should do, in the situation where the guardian is eligible in the foreign jurisdiction,
but not in the forum jurisdiction.277
c. National Guardianship Association Standards
In 1991, the National Guardianship Association ("the NGA"), a non-profit
corporation comprised of guardians, conservators, representatives, social workers, and
278 Sharon Rivenson Mark, Chapter 14. Duties, Responsibilities and Ethics for Guardians, 45
N.J. Prac., Elder Law--Guard. & Conserv. § 14, ftnt 1 (2006).
279National Guardianship Association, Standards of Practice 16 (2000),
http://guardianship.org/associations/2543/files/STANDARD.pdf.
280Id.
281 See note 23 FCSL Elder Law Clinic Matter.
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attorneys, developed and adopted “The Model Code of Ethics for Guardians,” and an
accompanying set of standards to serve as guidelines for providing guardianship services.278
The NGA, in response to continued abuses inherent in the guardianship system, revised its
model standards in 2003 (“Model Standards”). Although the initial Model Standards did not
denote specific qualifications for potential guardians and their eligibility, the revision
included a detailed list of qualifications that a candidate must satisfy to be eligible to be a
court-appointed guardian as set forth by the National Guardianship Foundation ("the
NGF").279 Persons with felony convictions were discussed and included in the class of
persons that were ineligible to be considered registered guardians.280
Although the qualifications set forth by the NGA and NGF in the Model Standards
were designed to benevolently screen potential guardians, the Standards are overreaching as
they eliminate many potential candidates from serving as guardians. For example, under the
Model Standards, the mother of the disabled child would still be disqualified to serve as her
child’s guardian simply because she was convicted of a felony nineteen years earlier.281
Rather than allowing the court to be the decision-maker in consideration of the ward’s best
interest, the Model Standards restrain the court from appointing a guardian that may
adequately represent the ward’s welfare. Once the discretion is removed from the court, the
groups most subject to deprivation are the indigent and those races that possess a
disproportionate number of felony convictions. Again, is disenfranchisement the goal of the
Model Standards or should the courts be the responsible decision makers?
282AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY,
REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, http://www.abanet.org/aging/wingspan.pdf.
283 “Wingspan, The Second National Guardianship Conference was convened November 30
through December 2, 2001, more than a decade after the original 1988 Wingspread
Symposium, to examine the progress made in the interim, and the steps that should be
recommended for the future with respect to guardianship law, policy, and practice.;B5;B5”
A. Frank Johns & Charles P. Sabatino, Wingspann--The Second National Guardianship
Conference, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 573 (Spring 2002).
284Id.
285American Bar Association Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly Report to the House
of Delegates, http://www.abanet.org/aging/wingspan.pdf.
286Press Release, American Bar Association, ABA Commission to Develop Recommendations
on Medical Forensic Issues Related to Elder Abuse and Neglect (Mar. 28, 2002),
http://www.abanet.org/aging/forensic.doc.
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d. The American Bar Association
In addition to the above-cited uniform models and standards governing the
guardianship process, the American Bar Association ("the ABA") also proposed positions on
the issue.282 In 2002, the ABA’s Commission on Law and Aging developed guardianship
guidelines for state and local governments to consider for adoption.283 The recommendations
are intended to guide states through policy-making decisions, including the establishment of
uniform qualifications of eligibility for the appointment of guardians.284 Specifically,
Recommendation 3b suggests states should adopt the NGA’s Standards of Practice and
Model Code of Ethics for Guardianships when determining whether a potential guardian is
qualified.285
The ABA proposes a carte blanc prohibition on appointing felons as guardians, much
like the position adopted in Florida. The ABA took this position, in part, because it was
concerned about the elderly being a vulnerable group and subject to abuse.286 While the
ABA’s concerns for elderly abuse are valid, its non-discretionary prohibition on the
appointment of felons as guardians is overreaching and inadequate. A blanket prohibition
287Whipple v. Dep’t of Corrs., State of Fla., 892 So.2d 554 (Fla.. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). The
Florida Third District Court of Appeal referenced the Bush v. Schiavo case that held that a
legislative enactment unconstitutionally encroached upon the power of the judiciary where the
act effectively reversed a properly rendered final judgment. Also, in Moore v. Pearson, 789
So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 2001), the court found that the Department of Corrections violated the
separation of power doctrine when it refused to implement an otherwise lawful coterminous
sentence); Hudson v. State, 682 So.2d 657 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Slay v. Singletary, 676
So.2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
An
288 A notable exception to this is Ohio, which allows a petitioner to obtain expunction of
Ohio’s records of a conviction in another state or federal court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2953.32 (West 2006); Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980).
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against felons serving as guardians fails to adequately address and prevent elder abuse and it
may deprive the indigent from having loving representation by family members.
CONCLUSION
With the demand for eligible guardians significantly increasing, and society
becoming more mobile, certain groups of people have tremendous needs to consider and
whether felons should be excluded as potential guardians, regardless of the circumstances. It
is ultimately up to the legislatures or the courts to make the decision of whether a person is
appointed as a guardian. When the legislature removes the court’s discretion in determining
the appointment of a guardian, the balance of power has been impaired.287 Should uniformity
exist between the states and should the "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution
control? What other alternatives exist for potential guardians with felonies, if any?
As discussed above, relying on alternatives, such as removing or nullifying a prior
felony conviction is improbable in most situations. Having a conviction dismissed upon
rehabilitation is limited in scope, and generally only applicable at the time of conviction.
Expunging or sealing a record is rarely available, and obtaining a pardon depends more upon
the politics and tradition of a state than upon legal procedures. Furthermore, because the
remedies of dismissal, expunction, and pardon must generally be applied for in the state or
jurisdiction where the conviction was entered,288 there is no guarantee that once obtained,
289 See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 959 P.2d 465, 468 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (dismissal and
expunction of records is “extraordinary remedy”).
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they will be given deference in other jurisdictions. However, if such relief is obtained, it is at
least arguable that it may qualify a previously ineligible petitioner for guardianship in the
four states that disqualify those with felony convictions from serving as guardians.
Nonetheless, pursuing a dismissal, expunction, or pardon may not be a feasible option
to many. The possibility of actually obtaining one of these remedies is questionable, as these
are extraordinary remedies in most states.289 These remedies are, therefore, of limited use
and probably only effective in a few situations where guardianships are sought by those with
past felony convictions.
The deference a forum court should provide under of "full faith and credit" to a
foreign order or decree is not clear from state to state. In some states, the deference appears
almost absolute so long as the foreign state had jurisdiction and there was no fraud in
obtaining the judgment. In other states, full faith and credit is either denied or the foreign
judgment or decree may be modified by the forum state. Hence, there is the unanswered
question in many states as to whether a guardian who would be ineligible to serve as a
guardian in a restraint state, but who has been appointed in a foreign state, may continue to
act within the forum state under principles of full faith and credit, or comity.
Another alternative limited in scope is the durable power of attorney. This remedy
requires the ward to have, at some point, enjoyed capacity and designated a guardian as the
attorney-in-fact. The obvious limitations are, (1) the power of attorney can be challenged in
court and (2) the ward must enjoy capacity to execute a power of attorney.
The failure of the above alternatives leaves many unanswered questions. Have the
states adopted the uniform standards as proposed by the National Probate Court? If so, do
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the standards adequately address the "portability" of the guardianship appointment from state
to state? Should the courts have the case-by-case discretion to make decisions in furtherance




State Statute Surrogate Decision Makers,including Durable Powers of
Attorney
Guardianship statutes
Alabama Ala. Code §26-1-2. Ala. Code § 26-2A-1
Ala. Code § 12-13-21
Ala. Code § 26-9-1
Alaska Alaska Stat. §47.30.825.
Alaska Stat. § 13.26.332
Alaska Stat. §13.26.150.
Alaska Stat. §13.26.344.
Alaska Stat. § 13.26.090
Arizona Ariz. Rev. Stat. ann. § 36-561.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-5501
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-5101
Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. § 28-68-101 Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-302.
Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-101
California Cal. Prob. Code § 4000 Cal. Prob. Code . § 2356.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5325.
Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 5326.6.
Cal. Prob. Code § 1500
Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-501
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-1-1303
Colo. Rev. Stat. 13-20-403.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-301
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-14-101
Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45A-562 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-677.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-668
DC D.C. Code Ann. §21-2211.
D.C. Code Ann. § 7-1305.07.
D.C. Code Ann. § 21-2081
D.C. Code Ann. § 7-1305.06.
D.C. Code Ann. § 21-2047.
D.C. Code Ann. § 21-2041
Delaware Del. Code Ann. tit. 12, § 4901 Del. Code Ann. tit. 16 §5161.
Del. Code Ann. tit. 12 § 3901
Florida Fla Stat. Ann. §765.113.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 709.01
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.459.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 394.4598.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.3215.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.3725.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 458.325.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 744.101.
Georgia Ga. Code Ann. § 31-36-1 Ga. Code Ann. § 31-8-108.
Ga. Code Ann. § 29-4-1.
Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. § 327E-5.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 551D-1.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 560:5-101.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 560:5-301.
Idaho Idaho Code § 15-5-501 Idaho Code § 66-405.
Idaho Code § 15-5-301.
Illinois 405 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-102.
755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 45/1-1.
405 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-110.
20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 3955/1.
Indiana Ind. Code § 30-5-1-1. Ind. Code § 29-3-1-1.
Ind. Code § 12-26-16-2.
Iowa Iowa Code § 144B.1.
Iowa Code § 633B.1.
Iowa Code § 229.23.
Iowa Code § 633.552.
Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-625.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-650.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-2978.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 76-12b10.
Kan. Stat. Ann. §59-
3018(g)(3)(g).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-3050.
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Kentucky Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 386.093. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §387.660.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 202B.060.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 387.500.
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 387.010.
Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:1517.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6:922.
La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art.
4541.
Maine Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A § 5-
501.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.18-A § 5-
101.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.18-A § 5-
301.
Maryland Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen. § 5-
605.
Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts §
13-601.
Md. Est. & Trusts Code Ann. §
13-704.
Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 201B § 1. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 123 § 23.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 201 § 6.
Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1717.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.5501.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 330.1600.
Minnesota Minn. Stat. § 523.01. Minn. Stat. § 525.56.
Minn. Stat. § 525.619.
Minn. Stat. § 524.5-301.
Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. § 87-3-101. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-111.
Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-121.
Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. § 404.700.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 404.800.
Mo. Rev. Stat. §630.133.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 475.01.
Montana Mont. Code. Ann. § 72-5-501. Mont. Code Ann. § 72-5-101.
Mont. Code Ann. § 72-5-301.
Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2664.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3401.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-260.1
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2617.
Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. 449.830.
Nev. Rev. Stat. 449.850 Power of
attorney.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 449.800.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.450.
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 159.013.
New Hampshire N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-J:1. N.H. Rev. Stat. §464-A: 25.
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 464-A:1.
N.H. Rev. Stat. § 161-F:52.
New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:2B-8.1. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-24.2. ...
See also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-
27.11d.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27 11d.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:6D-5.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:12-24.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3B:12-56.
New Mexico N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-5-501.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-5-601.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 43-1-15.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-5-301.
New York N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law §
10-1.1.
N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law
§11-1.1.
NY Mental Hyg. § 33.03.
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act Law §
403.
N.Y. Surr. Ct. Proc. Act Law §
1701.
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North Carolina N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-73.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-1.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-8.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 32A-15.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1201.
North Dakota N.D. Cent. Code § 23-12-13.
N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-30-01.
N.D. Cent. Code § 23-06.5-03.
N.D. Cent. Code § 25-01.2-11.
N.D. Cent. Code § 25-03.1-40.
Rights of Patients.
N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-28-12.
(5-312)
N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-28-01.
Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1337.01.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1337.11.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5122.271.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2111.01.
Oklahoma Okla. Stat. tit. 43A § 11-106.
Okla. Stat. tit. 58 § 1071.
Okla. Stat. tit. 30 § 3-119.
Okla. Stat. tit. 30 § 1-101.
Okla. Stat. tit. 30 § 3-101.
Oregon Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.540.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.005.
Or. Rev. Stat. § 125.300.
Pennsylvania 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5601. 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5521.
20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5501.
Rhode Island R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-4.10-1
R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-22-6.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 33-15-1.
South Carolina S.C. Code Ann. § 44-22-40.
S.C. Code Ann. §44-22-140.
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-501.
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-101.
S.C. Code Ann. § 62-5-301.
South Dakota S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-16-18.
S.D. Codified Laws § 27A-16-1.
S.D. Codified Laws § 59-6-11.
S.D. Codified Laws §27A-12-
3.20.
S.D. Codified Laws § 27A -12-
3.22.
S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-5-101.
Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-1001.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-6-101.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-6-415.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-1-101.
Texas Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Ann. § 137.011.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 166.152.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 166.163.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann.
§ 313.004.
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 481.
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 601.
Utah Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-504.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-501.
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-611.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-301.
Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 3501. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18 § 7627.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 3060.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 2602.
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14 § 2671.
Virginia Va. Code Ann. § 11-9.1. Va. Code Ann. § 37.1-134.21.
Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-162.18.
Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-2986.
Va. Code Ann. § 37.2-1000.
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Washington Wash. Rev. Code § 11.94.010. Wash. Rev. Code § 11.92.043.
Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.370.
Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.005.
West Virginia W. Va. Code § 39-4-1. W. Va. Code § 44A-1-1.
Wisconsin Wis. Stat. § 155.20.
Wis. Stat. § 243.07.
Wis. Stat. § 155.01.
Wis. Stat. § 51.61.
Wis. Stat. § 880.01.
Wyoming Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-5-101.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-5-201.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-202.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-5-205.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-5-132.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-1-101.
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-101.
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APPENDIX B
At the same time the demand for potential guardians for the elderly is increasing, the
potential pool of eligible applicants is decreasing dramatically and will continue to

























65+ 71,453,000 19.65% 2.76/1
20-64 197,027,000 54.19%
Table One shows that the eligible “younger” persons per elderly person that are possibly
qualified to act as a guardian, reduces almost 50% between 2000 and 2030. This table does
not differentiate between elderly persons capable of acting as guardians for other elderly
persons or account for the under “64" age category being eligible to act as guardians based
purely on chronological age.
If the projections are accurate, the potential guardians applicants for the population segment
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65 and older will be significantly reduced within the next twenty five years. In 2000 there
were 4.75 Americans between the ages of 20 and 64 for every American aged 65 and older.
This figure will decline by 2020 to 3.52 Americans aged 20-64 for every American aged 65
and older and will continue to decline to 2.76 Americans aged 20-64 for every American
aged 65 and older in 2030.
***************************************
The age distribution categories in 1900 versus the 2004 distributions, show that the
“younger generation” has decreased significantly while the “older generation” has
increased exponentially. If this trend continues, the possible demand for guardians will
increase and the pool of eligible guardians (assuming that guardians will be from




% of population as a
whole
2004 Age Distribution % of population as a
whole
Under 5 12.1% Under 5 6.8%
5-19 32.3% 5-19 20.9%
20-44 37.7% 20-44 35.6%
45-64 13.7% 45-64 24.1%
65+ 4.1% 65+ 12.3%
Life Expectancy Increases: The life expectancy for Americans in 1900 was 49.2. In 1900,
the younger population of the United States was dramatically larger by proportion than it is
today. Those aged 19 or under, comprised 44.4 % of the population. In 2004, the younger
population comprised 27.7 % of the population and the life expectancy increased to 77.85
years (2006).
Aging Demographics and the Population as a Whole: In 1900, 51.4 % of the US population
was between the ages of 20 and 64 and 4.1 % of the population was aged 65 and older.
There were 12.5 Americans aged 20-64 per every American aged 65 and older.
The population in the United States in 2004 aged 45-64 comprised 24.1 % of the population.
In 1900, the same population segment accounted for 13.7 % of the total population.
Whereas, at the turn of the 20th century, 44.4 % of the population approached the age of
majority as the population approached senior citizen status. The 45-64 age population
segment comprised 13.7 % of the population in 1900, and in 2004, only 27.7 % of the
population approached the age of majority as the population approached senior citizen
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status, i.e., 24.1%.
Those figures illustrate that there is a significantly greater proportion of Americans aged 65
and older (12.3 % in 2004) as compared to 1900 (4.1 %). The younger population is
declining proportionately as compared to the overall population and the older population is
dramatically increasing in size.
Reviewing the projections for the immediate future, we observe that the population of
Americans over 65 will increase between 2000 and 2030 by 7.23 %, while at the same time
the population of Americans aged 20-64 is projected to decrease by 4.83 %.
In the same time period, the projected amount of Americans aged 65 and older will increase
from 35 million in 2000 to over 71 million in 2030, more than doubling that population
category. The total US population is projected to increase from 282 million to 363 million
between 2000 and 2030. The increase is a population increase of nearly 81 million, and of
that projected increase in total population, Americans aged 65 and older represent over 36
million of that increase figure. That represents a 44.68 % increase of the estimated
population increase between 2000 and 2030.
When considering that the life expectancy is now nearly 29 years older as compared with
1900 and that there is a significantly smaller list of potential applicants for guardians for
those who have reached the age of senior citizen status, certain groups will be
disproportionately affected if felons are ineligible to serve as guardians over their loved
ones.
Decline in Household Populations: As the older population, relative to the overall
population, continues to increase, there has been a decline in the population per household
and the population per family. In 1955 the population per household was 3.33 and the
population per family was 3.59. Those figures have declined and in 2005 the population per
household and per family were 2.57, and 3.13, respectively.
Marriage: The rate of marriage has also declined. In 1900, there were 9.3 marriages per
every 1000 people. The marriage statistic rose to 11.1 marriages per every 1000 people in
1950, but it has steadily declined since 1950. In 2005 the figure had declined to 7.5
marriages per every 1000 people. The decline in the marriage rate is corroborated with a
rise in the divorce rate. In 1900 there were .7 divorces per 1000 people, which raised to 2.6
per 1000 people in 1950. In 2005 that figure has reached 3.6 divorces per every 1000
people.
20.6% of men aged 65-74 were either divorced, widowed, or never married in 2004. For
men in the age category of 75-84, that figure raises to 27.5%, and it increases further to
41.7% for men over the age of 85. For women, the figures are even more staggering. In
2004, 43.4% of women in the ages of 65-74 were divorced or widowed, and 63.7% of women
in the age group of 75-84, and 84.9% of women over the age of 85 were either divorced,
widowed, or never married.
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Americans living alone: The changes in demographics show an increase in older Americans
living alone. In 2004, 18.8% of men, and 39.7% of women over 65 years of age lived alone.
The number of older Americans living alone increased as the age of the individual increased,
as well. In 1970, 11.3% of men 65 to 74 years, and 19.1% of men 75 and older lived alone.
Those figures rose to 15.5% and 23.1%, respectively, by 2004. For women the statistics are
even more alarming. In 1970 , 31.7% of women 65 to 74 years of age, and 37% of women 75
and older lived alone. By 2004, the percentage of women between the ages of 65 to 74 living
alone had actually decreased to 29.4% but the percentage of women 75 and older living
alone had risen to 49.9% .
Decrease in the size of eligible guardians: As the size of families and households decline,
divorce rate increase, and the age of the older population increase at their projected rates,
the number of potentially eligible guardians per person will also decline.
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Size of Households and
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Felonies per 1000
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The pool of eligible guardians will dwindle for indigent wards very fast, especially when indigent
levels are considered for different races.
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APPENDIX C
Ga § 29-4-88. (a) The court may grant a petition for receipt and acceptance of a foreign
guardianship provided the court finds that: (1) The guardian is presently in
good standing with the foreign court; and (2) The transfer of the
guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction is in the best interest of the ward.
(b) In granting the petition, the court shall give full faith and credit to the
provisions of the foreign guardianship order concerning the determination
of the ward's incapacity. (enacted in 2004, effective July 1, 2005).
Md Code, Family
Law § 5-305.
(b) In accordance with the United States Constitution, this State shall
accord full faith and credit to: 1) an order of another state as to adoption or
guardianship in compliance with the other state's laws; and (2) termination
of parental rights in compliance with the other state's laws.
MD Code, Family
law, § 5-3A-05 and
§ 5-3B-04
(a) In this section, "order" includes any action that, under the laws of
another jurisdiction, has the force and effect of a comparable judicial order
under this subtitle. “Order of another state” (b) In accordance with the
United States Constitution, this State shall accord full faith and credit to: (1)
an order of another state as to adoption or guardianship in compliance with
the other state's laws; and (2) termination of parental rights in compliance
with the other state's law.
N.H. Rev. Stat. §
463:32-a
Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person of a minor by a
foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a minor who is temporarily in
this state, shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the
order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit, for a period of time
not exceeding 120 days.
N.H. Rev. Stat. §
463:32-b
I. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person or estate or
both, by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a minor who has
become a resident of this state, or who intends to move to this state, shall be
accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing
the guardian, with full faith and credit, for a period of time not exceeding
120 days following the date of the ward's residence in this state. . . .
N.H. Rev. Stat. §
464-A:44
II. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person for a person
who is temporarily in this state by a court of competent jurisdiction in any
other state shall be accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the
order appointing the guardian, with full faith and credit.
N. H. Rev Stat.
464-A:45
I. Any person who has been appointed guardian of the person or estate or
both by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction, for a person who has
become a resident of this state, or who intends to move to this state, shall be
accorded the powers of guardianship as reflected in the order appointing
the guardian, with full faith and credit, for 120 days following the date of
the ward's residence in this state or until an order is issued on a petition for
transfer of the guardianship filed within 120 days of the date of the ward's
residence in this state.
Ohio The judgment of another state's court as to the imposition of a guardianship








f) The court shall grant an application for receipt and acceptance of a
foreign guardianship if the transfer of the guardianship from the foreign
jurisdiction is in the best interests of the ward. In granting an application
under this subsection, the court shall give full faith and credit to the
provisions of the foreign guardianship order concerning the determination
of the ward's incapacity and the rights, powers, and duties of the guardian.
Tex. Prob. Code
Ann. § 892(f)
The court must grant an application for receipt and acceptance of a foreign
guardianship if the transfer of the guardianship from the foreign jurisdiction
is in the best interests of the ward. In granting an application, the court must
give full faith and credit to the provisions of the foreign guardianship order
concerning the determination of the ward's incapacity and the rights,
powers, and duties of the guardian.
